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FAIR TRADE:
THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO RECOVER
CAPTURED U.S. SERVICEMEMBERS AND
THE RECENT PRISONER EXCHANGE
WITH THE TALIBAN
Celidon Pitt*
The Obama Administration’s controversial exchange of five Taliban
detainees for a captured U.S. soldier in May 2014 reignited a heated debate
over the proper scope of wartime executive authority. From a legal
perspective, the primary issue centers on the constitutional balance of
power between congressional appropriations and the President’s power as
Commander in Chief. A complete analysis incorporates both judicial and
historical precedent to evaluate the conflict within the broader context of
prisoner recovery efforts.
This Note argues that, regardless of the validity of legislative restrictions
on the transfer of Guantánamo detainees, the President possessed sufficient
authority to conduct the prisoner exchange. Commanders in Chief have
retained exclusive control over recovery efforts since the Revolutionary
War, often exchanging nontraditional detainees for regular servicemembers
without any congressional opposition.
Furthermore, as this Note
concludes, Congress elsewhere granted the President ample discretion over
notification and defense spending to legally conduct the exchange.
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Congress are not a fit Body to act as a Council of war. They are too large,
too slow and their Resolutions can never be kept secret.1

INTRODUCTION
The Afghan valley consists mostly of scrub grass and boulders.2 U.S.
Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl seems disoriented as he sits in the back of a
pickup truck, repeatedly blinking his eyes as if seeing daylight for the first
time in a while.3 He makes small talk with a couple of men in traditional
dress, their faces covered and their hands gripping automatic rifles.4 The
churn of rotor blades from an approaching helicopter focuses Bergdahl’s
attention.5 A white scrap of fabric attached to a crooked piece of wood
snaps in the downwash as a dust cloud envelops the landing zone, causing
Bergdahl to blink even more.6
A handful of men stride out of the helicopter and toward the truck.7
They are wearing Western clothing and also cover their faces.8 The
1. Letter from Samuel Chase to Richard Henry Lee (May 17, 1776), in 4 LETTERS OF
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774–1789: MAY 16, 1776–AUGUST 15, 1776, at 22 (Paul Smith
ed., 1979).
2. This description is based on the open source video of the American recovery of
Bergdahl. See Mark Thompson, Watch the Bowe Bergdahl Video, TIME (June 4, 2014),
http://time.com/2822102/heres-what-that-bergdahl-video-really-shows/.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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exchange is quick and informal, each side offering small head nods before
going their separate ways.9 The Westerners accompany Bergdahl to the
helicopter, stopping him a few feet short to quickly pat him down for
hidden weapons or explosives.10 He does not seem to mind.11 Moments
later, the helicopter picks up and noses over, hugging the terrain on its way
out of the zone and taking the first step in Bergdahl’s long journey back to
American soil.12 The rest of the men jump in the pickup truck and drive
off, presumably to continue their efforts in support of the insurgency that
has plagued Afghanistan since the U.S. invasion in 2001.13
The scene in that valley, only a few minutes long, was the culmination of
years of negotiation between the U.S. government and the Taliban, which
had held Bergdahl captive since mid-2009.14 In exchange for Bergdahl’s
freedom, the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed to transfer five Taliban
detainees from the Guantánamo Bay Detention Center to Qatari custody.15
It also sent nearly one million dollars to Qatar as encouragement for the
country to accept the detainees and host them over the next year.16 The
return of the final American prisoner of war (POW) in Operation Enduring
Freedom—and indeed the broader “War on Terror”—was cause for
celebration17 and a necessary precursor to the abatement of the United
States’ involvement in Afghanistan.18 According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), however, the exchange was also illegal.19
The GAO’s argument for illegality focused on two statutes. First, section
8111 of the 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act20 (CAA) prohibited the
Pentagon from “using appropriated funds to transfer any individuals
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, American Soldier Freed by Taliban in Prisoner
Trade, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2014, at A1.
15. See id.
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO B-326013, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT 3 (2014) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
17. See Matt Furber, Planned Celebration for a Soldier Just Got a Whole Lot Bigger,
N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2014, at A7.
18. See Elisabeth Bumiller & Matthew Rosenberg, Parents of P.O.W. Reveal U.S. Talks
on Taliban Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1 (describing peace talks as “moribund” in
the absence of a prisoner exchange agreement); Jack Goldsmith, Two Legal Takeaways from
Yesterday’s
HASC
Hearing,
LAWFARE
(June
12,
2014,
9:19
AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/two-legal-takeaways-from-yesterdays-hasc-hearing/
(“[A] declaration of the end of the conflict—with the Taliban, al Qaeda, or both—would
trigger legal pressure and eventually a legal duty to release all Taliban and/or al Qaeda
detainees not subject to trial, including ones the President has deemed too dangerous to
release.”). Overall, the status of the Guantánamo detainees after U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan is unclear. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, How Wartime Detention Ends, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 625, 625–28 (2014); Stephen I. Vladeck, Detention After the AUMF, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2189, 2193–96 (2014).
19. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
20. Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII, § 8111, 128 Stat. 5.
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detained at Guantanamo Bay unless the Secretary of Defense notifies
certain congressional committees at least 30 days before the transfer.”21
Citing the time-sensitive nature of the negotiations, as well as the
questionable status of Bergdahl’s health, however, the Pentagon did not
notify Congress of the transfer until after it had been completed.22 Second,
the GAO concluded that DOD’s use of appropriated funds for an
unauthorized purpose—specifically the “reprogramming” of one million
dollars from the Army’s wartime operations and maintenance budget to pay
Qatar—violated the Antideficiency Act23 (ADA), which “prohibits federal
agencies from incurring obligations exceeding an amount available in an
appropriation.”24 DOD, in other words, could not afford to pay the Qataris
because it did not request money from Congress to do so.25 The GAO
limited its analysis to DOD’s noncompliance with the notification
requirements and spending limitations, avoiding the issue of the statutes’
underlying constitutionality.26 DOD immediately challenged this analysis,
arguing that the spending restrictions violated fundamental separation of
powers principles.27
The Bergdahl exchange is the most recent example of the tension
between the executive and legislative branches over the conduct and
funding of national security–related matters. This conflict stems largely
from each branch’s perception of the proper scope of its powers, as well as
the dynamic nature of wartime operations and their resistance to easy
classification as either “tactics” subject to presidential discretion or “policy”
subject to congressional oversight.28 As the United States has moved
increasingly toward short-term, limited engagements overseas, the issue has
become more relevant and contentious.29

21. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1. This provision incorporated an identical
notification requirement from the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). See
Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 672.
22. Krishnadev Calamur, Bergdahl Swap Was ‘Extraordinary Situation,’ Hagel Says,
NPR
(June
11,
2014,
10:01
AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2014/06/11/320969162/hagel-to-face-skeptical-lawmakers-over-bergdahl-trade.
23. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2014).
24. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1; Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97
YALE L.J. 1343, 1374–77 (1988) (discussing the Antideficiency Act and the principle of
appropriations control).
25. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 6–7.
26. See id. at 5–6.
27. See id. at 6; DOD, Administration Views Provided to the Government Accountability
Office, available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/GAOResponse-question-3-FINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
28. See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress:
Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 404 (2008) (“Virtually all
important decisions as to the conduct of a war . . . can be framed as either ‘tactical’ military
decisions for the President to make as Commander in Chief or broad policy decisions for
Congress to make under its war powers.”).
29. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 944–45 (2008); see also JAMES E.
BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE 99 (2007); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 5 (2013).
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Indeed, the War on Terror’s “unusual entwinement with the home front,
its heavy focus on preemptive action and intelligence collection, and its
targeting of a diffuse, non-state enemy, all guarantee that presidential uses
of force are likely to be conducted for years to come in a context that is
thick with statutory restrictions.”30 Yet there is no clear answer from the
courts over the degree to which Congress may restrain the ability of the
President to negotiate the recovery of American prisoners of war in
exchange for U.S.-held detainees.31
This Note examines the origins of the conflict over the Bergdahl-Taliban
exchange and ultimately concludes that the President had the constitutional
power to authorize the exchange. Part I explores the historical development
of defense appropriations and contextualizes the conflict over national
security spending within a broader constitutional framework, focusing on
the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches and
the judiciary’s reluctance to intervene. This part includes an evaluation of
the President’s powers as Commander in Chief and the traditional practice
of congressional deference to executive leadership in matters pertaining to
the recovery of U.S. captives during hostilities.
In Part II, this Note examines the current controversy over whether the
Obama Administration failed to comply with the terms of the 2014 CAA
and ADA. In doing so, this Note addresses the separation of powers
implications raised by the dispute. Congress, on the one hand, has viewed
its funding restrictions on transfers and releases from Guantánamo as an
appropriate means of governing the conduct of war. The President, on the
other hand, has argued that, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, he
is the only person entrusted with the discretion to determine detainee policy
and to ensure the safe repatriation of American servicemembers. Finally, in
Part III, this Note argues that Congress, by severely limiting the President’s
ability to negotiate for the release of an American POW, abused its power
of the purse and infringed on the President’s authority as Commander in
Chief.
I. THE SWORD AND THE PURSE:
THE BALANCE BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE WAR POWERS
Throughout American history, the power of the purse has been one of the
most effective means of legislative control of defense policy, which is
executed by the President in his role as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces. Part I.A.1 discusses the origins of the appropriations doctrine and
analyzes several of its historical applications. Part I.A.2 outlines the
historical and textual basis for the President’s authority as Commander in
Chief. Part I.B surveys U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence evaluating the
appropriate scope of executive power, focusing on the tripartite scheme
30. Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 945.
31. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRES. STUDIES Q. 466
(2005) (contrasting pre- and post-Vietnam War judicial responses to challenges of the
President’s war powers); Lobel, supra note 28, at 408–09 (discussing the judiciary’s refusal
to address cases relating to tension between legislative and executive powers).
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articulated in Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer32 as the most appropriate method for determining the
legitimacy of presidential action. Part I.C examines several practical
examples of the overlapping spheres of defense appropriations riders,
congressional notification requirements, and negotiations over the recovery
of captured U.S. military personnel, drawing from them broader
conclusions about agreed-upon standards for legislative and executive
conduct in these areas.
A. Textual and Historical Origins of the Tension
Between Congress’s Defense Spending Power
and the President’s Authority As Commander in Chief
The U.S. Constitution’s grant of the power of the purse to Congress is an
“empowerment of the legislature [that] is at the foundation of our
constitutional order.”33 Congress often has exercised that authority in the
context of defense spending, using it as a tool to set and enforce broad
policy objectives.34 Likewise, the President’s authority as Commander in
Chief has deep historical roots that directly explain the scope of his
authority to coordinate the recovery of captured U.S. servicemembers.35
The power of the purse and the Commander-in-Chief power are not always
mutually exclusive—there have been many historical instances of overlap
and controversy. This section explains how each doctrine has developed.
1. Congress’s Defense Spending Power
Within democratic governments, the authority to raise revenue has long
been recognized as one of a legislature’s most fundamental powers.36 The
British Parliament, one of the antecedents to the U.S. Congress, exercised
its power of the purse over national security affairs consistently but not
uniformly, often supplying the military only in exchange for concessions
from the King.37 American colonial assemblies, Congress’s other principal
legislative model, frequently seized on opportunities presented by military
emergencies to expand their political control.38 This system broke down
during the Revolutionary War, however, when “the exigencies of war”
revealed the inefficiency of battlefield decisions being made by committees
far from the front lines.39
32. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. Stith, supra note 24, at 1344.
34. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.
35. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
36. See Stith, supra note 24, at 1344.
37. See WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND
THE POWER OF THE PURSE 16–17 (1994).
38. In 1715, for example, Virginia’s House of Burgesses granted funding for defense
against attacks by Native Americans only on the condition that the governor repeal an
unpopular tobacco act. See id. at 19.
39. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689,
778 (2008).
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Congress retained the power of the purse upon ratification of the
Constitution largely as a check on executive power.40 Article I, Section 9
of the Constitution states, “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”41 This
“structural imperative” ensures that the President may not withdraw funds
on his own initiative, for whatever reason.42 Legislative authority over
defense appropriations is further codified in Article I, Section 8, which
grants Congress the powers to “raise and support Armies”43 and “provide
and maintain a Navy”44 and was largely drafted in response to war-making
abuses by the Crown.45 These provisions, when combined with the power
“to declare [w]ar,”46 seemed to give the legislative branch control over the
broader aspects of defense policy.47
At first, Congress exercised this appropriation power through a linear
process of request, authorization, and appropriation.48 This distinction was
sharpest before the Civil War, when congressional appropriations contained
only the duration, amount, and purpose of the granted funds.49 Over time,
the line between authorizations and appropriations began to blur, as funding
grants contained more and more restrictions in the form of riders designed
to limit executive discretion over a given program.50 Through World War
II, though, defense appropriations were largely immune to this trend,
remaining mostly “no strings attached” checks given to the President to
spend as he saw fit during various war efforts.51 However, beginning in the
1950s, increasing congressional skepticism over military and covert actions
prompted Congress to seek additional oversight through the imposition of
various riders to defense spending bills, with the understanding that the
President may not spend funds Congress has granted him unless he
complies with the conditions Congress sets.52

40. See Stith, supra note 24, at 1349.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
42. Stith, supra note 24, at 1349–50.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
44. Id. cl. 13.
45. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to the
President-Elect, 39 PRES. STUDIES Q. 347, 353 (2009) (“The British model gave the king the
absolute power to make war. The framers repudiated that form of government
because . . . [t]he resulting military adventures were disastrous to their countries, both in
lives lost and treasures squandered.”).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
47. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643 (1952) (These
clauses “certainly lay[] upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces.
Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in
what manner and by what means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement.”);
Fisher, supra note 45, at 354.
48. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 102–16 (2005); BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 43–
45.
49. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 45.
50. See id. at 46–47.
51. See id. at 47–48.
52. See id. at 48–53; see also infra Part I.C.1–2.
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2. The President’s Authority As Commander in Chief
In the British military, commanders in chief, just like the King himself,
depended on parliamentary appropriations for supplies and pay, and the
position “had very little, if any, discretion to act in contravention of
Parliament.”53 This system became the model for the Continental Army, of
which the Continental Congress appointed George Washington “General
and Commander in [C]hief, of the army of the United Colonies,” in June
1775.54 The Founders curtailed Washington’s powers as Commander in
Chief even further than Parliament had restricted the King, so that rather
than “hav[ing] sole power to conduct warfare,” Washington could merely
“direct military campaigns subject to legislative oversight.”55
Such oversight was rarely smooth, however. Friction between the
Continental Congress and Washington led to various military setbacks
throughout the Revolutionary War,56 and the problem was especially
apparent under exigent circumstances.57 In response to these tactical
failures, the Continental Congress allowed for a “gradual but substantial
augmentation” of Washington’s power during the latter years of the war.58
Delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 recorded only a
“limited discussion” of the issue.59 As a means of mitigating the threat
posed by an unchecked executive, the Framers consciously “rejected a
government in which a single branch could both make war and fund it.”60
The Constitution solidified the President’s singular role as Commander in
Chief of the armed forces61 while also requiring him to recruit, equip, train,
and deploy those forces only with money granted by Congress.62 Beyond
this basic alignment of sword and state, neither the text of the Constitution
nor the records of the Convention and ratification process offers much
insight into the intended scope of the President’s powers as Commander in
Chief.63
53. Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 773.
54. 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 96 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford et al. eds., 1905).
55. Lobel, supra note 28, at 419.
56. See ROBERT MIDDLEKAUF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE 333–558 (2005).
57. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 779–80.
58. Id. at 779. But see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 78 (1990) (As President, George
Washington “took military action only once without express congressional authorization,
and even then, Congress arguably endorsed his decision by subsequent acts.”).
59. Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 792. According to Barron and Lederman,
though, it is a “common assumption” that the Framers “were specifically aiming to prevent
the sorts of inefficiencies that characterized the earlier regime, when the Continental
Congress had micromanaged General Washington.” Id. at 779.
60. Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 J. AM. INT’L
L. 758, 762 (1989).
61. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States.”).
62. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; cl. 12–13.
63. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 788 (“The most that can be said about
which branch ultimately should be in control of the ‘direction’ of the armed forces, in light
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Congress directly regulated the military in the early days of the Republic,
dictating the organization of the armed forces as well as the qualifications
for who could join them.64 Later, during the Civil War, President Abraham
Lincoln acted several times in his capacity as Commander in Chief with
neither congressional permission nor appropriation, but each time returned
to the legislature for ex post confirmation of and funding for his decisions.65
This “give and take” continued through World Wars I and II, with Congress
regulating general military functions while avoiding intrusion into tactical
decision making.66
Regulation, moreover, was not equivalent to command, as Congress still
recognized the need for presidential discretion in the handling of specific
troop movements and the recovery of captured U.S. personnel.67 Congress
enshrined this principle in the National Security Act of 1947,68 which
“place[d] American governmental decisions regarding war making,
intelligence, covert operations, military sales, and military aid under the
executive’s unified and coordinated control.”69 Since its enactment,
controversy has arisen over the ability of the executive branch to initiate
war, but never over its authority to dictate tactical decisions.70 Throughout
this period, the President also has engaged in various negotiations and
agreements with state and non-state actors, often for the return of captured
Americans.71
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the Scope of Executive Authority
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the balance
between the spending and Commander-in-Chief powers, its holdings on
somewhat analogous issues provide insight into how that balance might be

of the available evidence, is that the Framers did not assign that function at all in the text of
the Constitution.”); see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 46, 190 (2010).
64. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 957.
65. See, e.g., Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases:
Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53–92
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
66. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1034–55.
67. See generally id. See also infra Part I.C.3.
68. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
69. KOH, supra note 58, at 102.
70. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1059–98. Overall, “the [P]resident
remains at the center of the national security process” because he alone “speak[s] on behalf
of the United States in a way that congressional and other national leaders cannot. . . . In
addition, in time of crisis it is the president who often decides on whether and how to use the
national security tools that are the product of legislative authorization and appropriation.”
BAKER, supra note 29, at 101.
71. See, e.g., MITCHELL B. REISS, NEGOTIATING WITH EVIL: WHEN TO TALK TO
TERRORISTS 11–12 (2010) (listing various examples, including payment of the Barbary
pirates under three Presidents, concessions to a Berber chieftain by President Theodore
Roosevelt, and the transfer of weapons to Iran under President Ronald Reagan); David
Ignatius, Tea with the Taliban?, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2008, at B7 (describing the early
efforts of the George W. Bush Administration to enter peace negotiations in Afghanistan
despite the ongoing conflict).
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struck. This section provides an overview of the Supreme Court decisions
relevant to analyzing the Bergdahl-Taliban prisoner exchange.
The Supreme Court has implied that the President possesses exclusive
power not explicitly stated in Article II, but that the independent war
powers conferred by the Commander in Chief Clause are still subject to
undefined statutory limitations.72 This gap has led one scholar to conclude
that “Congress may constitutionally constrain the President as long as the
legislative action does not violate a mandatory provision or express
restriction of the Constitution and does not impede on an exclusive
presidential power.”73 Just as “a state of war is not a blank check for the
President,”74 neither, as Chief Justice John Marshall once observed, are “the
whole powers of war” vested in Congress.75 The Court has addressed this
tension in three main decisions.
1. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.: What Are the Limits
of Presidential Discretion over Foreign Affairs?
The Supreme Court first evaluated the degree to which the powers of the
federal government vary between foreign (“external”) and domestic
(“internal”) affairs in its 1936 decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.76 Seeking to curb American involvement in the Chaco War
between Bolivia and Paraguay, Congress passed a joint resolution in 1934
empowering the President to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions to any
party in the conflict.77 President Franklin Roosevelt soon issued a
proclamation implementing the ban, which remained in place for over a

72. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 39, at 772; Fisher, supra note 45, at 352
(“Although some justices of the Supreme Court have described the president’s foreign
relations power as ‘exclusive,’ the Court itself has not denied to Congress its constitutional
authority to enter the field and reverse or modify presidential decisions in the area of
national security and foreign affairs.”); Abraham D. Sofaer, Presidential Power and
National Security, 37 PRES. STUDIES Q. 101, 110–120 (2007) (analyzing the balance between
executive prerogative and legislative oversight in the area of national defense).
73. William M. Hains, Comment, Challenging the Executive: The Constitutionality of
Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime Detention Policies, 2011 BYU L. REV.
2283, 2284. Hains based most of his legal analysis of congressional control over
Guantánamo policy on Professor Lobel’s framework for evaluating shared and exclusive
governmental powers. See id. at 2297–2300; Lobel, supra note 28, at 445–51; see also KOH,
supra note 58, at 4 (“Although the National Security Constitution has assigned the president
the predominant role in making foreign policy decisions, it has granted him only limited
exclusive powers. Thus, the Constitution directs most governmental decisions regarding
foreign affairs into a sphere of concurrent authority, under presidential management, but
bounded by the checks provided by congressional consultation and judicial review.”); Fisher,
supra note 45, at 354 (The title of Commander in Chief “was never intended to give the
president sole power to initiate war and determine its scope. Such an interpretation would
nullify the express powers given to Congress under Article I and undercut the framers’
determination to place the power of war with the elected representatives of Congress.”).
74. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
75. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801).
76. 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of CurtissWright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 65, at 195–232.
77. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–13.
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year.78 The Court considered the scope of the non-delegation doctrine,
finding that, by granting the President the authority to validate their
resolution, Congress did not “abdicate[] its essential functions [by]
delegat[ing] them to the Executive.”79
The Court’s analysis also more broadly examined the President’s unique
power to dictate U.S. foreign affairs.80 The Court explained that Congress
only plays a limited role in foreign affairs because, “[i]n this vast external
realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.”81 Although the President makes treaties with the “Advice and
Consent of the Senate,”82 for example, “he alone negotiates” their terms.83
The Court further concluded that the President, as “the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations,”84 has discretion to act beyond the powers specifically enumerated
in Article II.85 This responsibility reflects the special trust inherent to the
office, giving the President latitude to act with “caution and unity of
design” toward foreign nations.86
The Court then clarified the role of Congress in relation to the President,
concluding that legislation affecting external affairs must grant the
President “freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved[, because] . . . he, not
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.”87
The opinion concluded with a warning about the “unwisdom” of narrow
congressional resolutions meant to control the President’s discretion in
external affairs.88
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer:
When May the President Act in Contravention of Congressional Will?
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court
considered whether President Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills to avert
a labor crisis during the Korean War fell within the scope of his inherent

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. at 312–13.
Id. at 315.
See id. at 319–22.
Id. at 319.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
Id. (quoting then-Congressman John Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
See id. at 320. But see Louis Fisher, The Sole Organ Doctrine, STUDIES ON
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN FOREIGN RELATIONS, STUDY NO. 1 (Law Library of Cong. 2006),
available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/SoleOrgan-Aug06.pdf (criticizing
the popular use of Curtiss-Wright as justification for the existence of independent
presidential power in foreign affairs).
86. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
87. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 321–22.
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executive authority.89 In reaching its conclusion that the executive order
authorizing the seizure violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Court also offered a broader examination of the
appropriate allocation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches.90 President Truman, the government argued, had been motivated
to act not out of greed or hunger for power.91 Instead, his fear of the
damage to the overseas war effort that could result from even a brief strike
led President Truman to exercise his “inherent power” as the country’s
chief executive and Commander in Chief.92 This inherent power, the
government urged, was “supported by the Constitution, by historical
precedent, and by court decisions.”93
The Court disagreed. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, stated
that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either
from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”94 In this case, the
fact that Congress already had considered and rejected the use of seizures to
help resolve labor disputes left only the Constitution as a possible source
for executive authority.95 However, Article II restricts the President’s
“functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks
wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.”96 Congress could have
authorized the seizure of steel mills, but it did not; therefore, the President’s
decision to do so anyway was an invalid exercise of legislative power by
the executive branch.97
Justice Jackson famously concurred in the opinion.98 He began by
addressing the need for a pragmatic approach in resolving competing
legislative and executive claims, one based on an understanding of the
entire document and the history of interaction among the branches.99
Because “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress,”100 Justice Jackson
announced a tripartite scheme for evaluating the constitutionality of
presidential action in relation to Congress.101

89. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). See
generally Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER
STORIES, supra note 65, at 233.
90. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585–89.
91. See id. at 583.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 584 (quoting government’s motion in opposition to a preliminary injunction).
94. Id. at 585.
95. See id. at 586–87.
96. Id. at 587.
97. See id. at 588.
98. See id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring); KOH, supra note 58, at 105; Lobel, supra
note 28, at 445.
99. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (“The actual art of governing under our
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”).
100. Id.
101. See id. at 635–38.
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In the first category, the President’s “authority is at its maximum” when
he “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”102
These actions are “supported by the strongest of presumptions and [given]
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation”103 because they are fully
aligned with the Constitution and conducted with the sum of congressional
and presidential authority.104 In Youngstown, Congress did not just fail to
authorize the mill seizures, it repeatedly refused to do so.105
Alternatively, in the second category outlined in the concurring opinion,
the President can still act on his own authority if Congress is silent on a
particular issue.106 This category is especially relevant in times of
congressional backlog or disinterest, and courts will often interpret silence
on the part of Congress as consent to the presidential action.107 Actions in
this category exist in a “zone of twilight in which [the President] and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain.”108 Within this second category, a judicial analysis will be
highly contextual, a theme echoed in the Court’s remarks on the appropriate
interpretation of constitutional ambiguities.109 Here, Congress took action
and directly addressed the issue, providing several alternative channels for
the seizure of private property.110 The Truman Administration’s refusal to
use any of these methods could not be justified by a lack of available
options.111
Finally, the third category involves presidential action that runs contrary
Under these
to congressional will, either express or implied.112
circumstances, the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.”113 Justice Jackson acknowledged that
the President does, in fact, possess some inherent, or non-delegated,
powers.114 These powers alone, though, usually are not sufficient to
overcome explicit congressional rejection of a given action.115

102. Id. at 635.
103. Id. at 637.
104. Id. at 635–37.
105. See Bellia, supra note 89, at 241–42.
106. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. (“[A]ny actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”).
110. See id. at 639.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 637.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 640; see also id. at 653 (identifying and discussing “the gap that exists
between the President’s paper powers and his real powers”).
115. See id. at 640; see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (resolving a
conflict between the President’s authority as Commander in Chief to seize foreign vessels
during war and Congress’s ability to limit that power via statute). The Little Court held that
a statute will prevail over a conflicting presidential proclamation, even in a time of war,
because “the legislature seem[s] to have prescribed . . . the manner in which [the] law shall
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3. Dames & Moore v. Regan:
Is Congressional Silence Tantamount to Acquiescence?
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,116 the Supreme Court addressed the degree
to which the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs may translate to
domestic issues.117 The Court applied the Youngstown framework to find
that an executive order issued with the acquiescence of Congress was a
valid exercise of the President’s authority, thus taking a deferential view of
executive power to dictate “the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute
between our country and another.”118
To resolve the Iran hostage crisis, during which several dozen U.S.
diplomats and citizens were held captive in Tehran for almost fifteen
months,119 President Jimmy Carter agreed on behalf of the United States to
terminate all litigation between its nationals and the government of Iran.120
Because of the close ties between the deposed Shah of Iran and the United
States, there had been many U.S. businesses operating in Iran who had
brought suits in U.S. courts to recover on property or contracts in Iran that
had been devalued, nullified, or placed at risk by the sudden regime change
there.121 President Carter issued—and President Ronald Reagan later
confirmed—an executive agreement implementing the terms of the
settlement with Iran and establishing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
as the venue for final arbitration of all claims between the nationals and
governments of the two countries.122 Dames & Moore, an American
engineering and consulting firm with preexisting claims against the
government of Iran that were not related to the hostage crisis, challenged
the validity of the tribunal as the sole venue for satisfaction of its claims.123
In upholding the executive agreement and cementing the tribunal as a
legitimate means of resolution,124 the Court also weighed the degree to
which an executive order stemming from the President’s authority to
conduct foreign affairs may control the pursuit of lawsuits that had already
been filed—and, in some cases, decided—in U.S. courts.125 Congress had
neither authorized nor prohibited the establishment of the arbitral tribunal,
nor had Congress addressed the agreement establishing it.126 Instead,
Congress displayed a history of “acquiescence in conduct of the sort
be carried into execution.” Id. at 177–78. Of course, this conclusion presumes that the
statute complied with the Constitution in the first place.
116. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
117. See id. at 675.
118. Id. at 688.
119. DAVID FARBER, TAKEN HOSTAGE 1–2 (2004).
120. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664–65.
121. See Harold H. Bruff, The Story of Dames & Moore: Resolution of an International
Crisis by Executive Agreement, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 65, at 369,
381–82.
122. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 664–66.
123. See id. at 666–67.
124. See id. at 686.
125. See id. at 667.
126. See id. at 678–79; see also Bruff, supra note 121, at 381–82.

2852

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

engaged in by the President.”127 According to the Court, this acquiescence,
when combined with the President’s Article II power to enter the agreement
with Iran and various historical precedents of presidential resolution of the
claims of American nationals against foreign governments, placed the
executive order into the first category identified by Justice Jackson in his
Youngstown concurrence.128
The Dames & Moore Court interpreted legislative history of
congressional silence as proof of congressional consent.129 As such, the
executive order was “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation.”130 By acquiescing to the exercise
of presidential authority, Congress had given the order tacit approval.131
The decision also qualified Youngstown by noting that a given executive
action falls on a spectrum, “not neatly in one of three pigeonholes,”
especially in cases “involving responses to international crises the nature of
which Congress can hardly have been expected to anticipate in any
detail.”132 The Court stated that judicial interpretation of legislative intent
should therefore be more lenient to executive authority in cases involving
foreign affairs and particularly under emergent or unforeseen
circumstances, such as the need to negotiate for the release of U.S.
hostages.133 Executive agreements, made without the consent of the
Senate, have survived this and subsequent rounds of judicial review as a
valid exercise of the President’s Article II powers.134
C. Practical Precedents Illustrating the Balance
Between Legislative and Executive War Powers
Congress repeatedly has tried to check the President’s ability to wage
war, using assorted means to at least oversee—if not attempt to seize
outright control of—the executive branch’s conduct of military
operations.135 The White House has offered various reactions to these
methods, ranging from unchallenged acceptance, to grudging acquiescence,
to blatant disregard.136 Two primary methods, appropriations riders and the
127. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678–79.
128. See id. at 674.
129. See id. at 678.
130. Id. at 674 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. See id. at 686.
132. Id. at 669.
133. See id.
134. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 219–
24 (2d ed. 1996). The exact contours of the form and substance of executive agreements
remain undefined. See id. at 224 (“If an agreement is within the President’s power, there
seem to be no formal requirements as to how it shall be made. . . . [T]here is no reason why
an executive agreement must be formal or even that it has to be in writing.”).
135. See KOH, supra note 58, at 128 (citing “statutory sunset provisions, reporting and
consultation requirements, committee oversight procedures, legislative vetoes, and
appropriations limitations”); Lobel, supra note 28, at 401 (explaining that, under the general
rules and tactical commands theory, the President traditionally implements and enforces
broad congressional policy decisions, including those related to military affairs).
136. See Lobel, supra note 28, at 411–12.

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PRISONER EXCHANGES

2853

implementation of requirements for congressional notification and
consultation, have emerged as both the most effective and the most popular
congressional tools for checking the President’s war powers. This section
will describe several of the ways in which Congress has used these tools to
attempt to shape national security policy.
1. Appropriations Riders As a Means of Congressional Oversight:
The Boland Amendments and the Iran-Contra Affair
Appropriations riders, which contain specific conditions on the grant of
funds and are inserted as amendments to large spending bills, give Congress
an opportunity to more narrowly tailor the use of federal money.137 As one
scholar notes, this dimension of the power of the purse has been “one of the
major factors in shaping and restricting presidential decision making with
respect to the commitment of forces abroad.”138 Congress has traditionally
given the President much more discretion over the use of funds during
times of emergency or conventional war than under circumstances of
indefinite conflict or terrorist threat.139 Riders to defense spending bills
therefore have become more common over the last fifty years, as Congress
has sought to exercise more control over small wars and covert activity.140
The Iran-Contra Affair combined all of these elements and sparked a
broader debate about the role of “restrictive national security
appropriations” in shaping defense policy.141
The Reagan Administration’s attempts to overthrow the Communist
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the early 1980s were scandalous for
several reasons.142 Congress, concerned over reports that the White House
was raising and training the anti-Sandinista Contra movement without
appropriate oversight, passed an initial spending restriction in 1982.143 This
amendment to the DOD Appropriations Act prohibited the use of funds for
military equipment, training, or other activities in support of any group not
part of the Nicaraguan armed forces.144
Under the leadership of House Intelligence Committee Chair Edward
Boland, Congress gradually tightened funding restrictions over the next

137. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 43–44.
138. JAMES P. TERRY, THE WAR ON TERROR: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 42 (2013).
139. See id. at 49 (“In wartime, the Congress has gladly delegated its responsibilities to
the president. In periods of conflict or terrorist threats short of declared war, it has retained
that level of control, through funding restrictions and other legislative enactments, necessary
to ensure that vital national interests are reflected in the actions of the Commander-inChief.”).
140. See id. at 42–44 (describing the use of appropriations riders to affect U.S. activity
throughout Africa, Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia, and the Soviet Union).
141. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 37, at 137.
142. See KOH, supra note 58, at 101–16.
143. See S. REP. NO. 100-216, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at 3 (1987) [hereinafter IRANCONTRA REPORT]. As Harold Koh explains, “The Iran-Contra affair occurred in two
constitutional areas of shared congressional-executive authority—military aid and covert
operations.” KOH, supra note 58, at 113.
144. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 143, at 3.
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several years.145 Congress eliminated all funding by 1984, declaring that
no money designated for intelligence activities “may be obligated or
expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting,
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by
any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.”146 President
Reagan signed these provisions into law without objection.147
Despite these restrictions, staff members of the National Security Council
(a group known as “the Enterprise”) channeled money to the Contras as part
of a larger scheme to also free U.S. hostages being held in Lebanon by
Iranian-backed forces.148 The Iran-Contra Affair prompted Congress to
initiate an investigation into the executive branch’s apparent deceit and
resolve potential constitutional issues.149 The congressional committee
concluded that the Enterprise executed a covert Contra aid program by
raising “private and non-appropriated money[] and without the
accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA.”150 Moreover,
this was a program “that Congress thought it had prohibited.”151 Aside
from the conviction of one member of the Enterprise for the commission of
several minor offenses, no legal consequences stemmed from the IranContra Affair.152 Congress issued a series of recommendations at the end
of its report, reminding the White House that “Congress is the partner, not
the adversary of the executive branch, in the formulation of policy” and
calling for a more rigid system of presidential findings related to covert
action.153
2. Consultation and Notification Requirements
A second method of congressional control over defense policy is the
enactment of consultation and notification requirements, either through
attachment to a spending bill or as stand-alone legislation.154 When the
political system is functioning as designed, the formal framework of
consultation and notification is often complemented by a less rigid, more ad
hoc consultative process between the executive and legislative branches that
is “an essential unwritten ingredient in the national security process.”155
145. See id.
146. DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat.
1837, 1935 (1984).
147. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1082.
148. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 143, at 4.
149. Id. at xv–xvi; see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 180 (1995)
(explaining that, in addition to spending non-appropriated funds, the executive branch
usurped another congressional function by effectively issuing a letter of marque and reprisal
to use private parties for military purposes); KOH, supra note 58, at 113 (President Reagan
“denied Congress its constitutional entitlement to participate in the setting of broad foreign
policy objectives as well as its attendant rights to information and consultation”).
150. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 143, at 4.
151. Id.
152. See KOH, supra note 58, at 36.
153. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 143, at 423–27.
154. See KOH, supra note 58, at 128.
155. BAKER, supra note 29, at 103.
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Congress also must strike a balance between fulfilling its role as a
representative body and observing the need for limited transparency in the
national security context.156 This section will examine two recent efforts by
Congress to control presidential discretion through the use of reporting
requirements.
a. The War Powers Resolution
Spurred by the mission creep of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the War
Powers Resolution was “the product of almost four decades of bipartisan
effort to recapture legislative authority that had drifted to the President.”157
The resolution declared that any foreign introduction of U.S. armed forces
without a declaration of war would require the President to submit a report
to congressional leaders within forty-eight hours.158 The report must
contain details about, at a minimum, the circumstances leading to the
deployment, the constitutional and legislative authority under which the
President is conducting the military operation, and an estimation of the
involvement’s scope and duration.159 This reporting requirement remains
in effect for the duration of the engagement, during which the President
must submit updates at least every six months.160 Furthermore, the
engagement must cease after sixty days unless Congress has declared war,
been incapacitated, or voted to delay the deadline.161
The War Powers Resolution was controversial during its enactment and
has been applied unevenly since.162 The first test came in 1975, when
President Gerald Ford initially sought authorization to evacuate the
remaining U.S. personnel from Cambodia and South Vietnam, but, after
growing impatient with congressional delays, unilaterally approved the
evacuations under his executive authority to protect American lives.163
Two missions to recover captured Americans, from the Mayaguez
commercial ship under President Ford and the U.S. embassy in Iran under
President Carter, have complied with the reporting requirements in letter
but not in spirit.164 In both cases, the White House circumvented

156. See id.
157. FISHER, supra note 149, at 128.
158. See 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (2014). The statute makes exceptions for the military’s
planned forward-deployment at any given time, waiving the reporting requirement if the
troops are already present in a foreign country and will not be “substantially enlarge[d],” or
if they are engaged in non-combat activities. Id. § 1543(a)(1)–(3).
159. See id. § 1543(a)(3)(A)–(C).
160. See id. § 1543(c).
161. See id. § 1544(b). The President may extend this window another thirty days if he
determines “that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed
Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such forces.” Id.
162. See FISHER, supra note 149, at 134–61.
163. See id. at 135–36.
164. See id.
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congressional input by waiting to file the report until after the engagement
had either ceased or “reached the point of no return.”165
b. Intelligence Oversight
Congress possesses similar tools for oversight of the intelligence
community.166 Passed in the wake of revelations about counterproductive
covert actions in Latin America and Southeast Asia, the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980167 prohibits the President from authorizing a covert
action without first making a formal determination that “such an action is
necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United
States and is important to the national security of the United States.”168
This finding must be submitted in writing to the congressional
intelligence oversight committees prior to the initiation of the covert action,
unless the President determines that “it is essential to limit access to the
finding to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
United States.”169 In that case, the President may inform only the chairs
and ranking minority members of each intelligence committee, as well as
the majority and minority leaders in both the House and the Senate, as long
as he provides a written justification for doing so.170 If the President
complies with neither of these options, he still must inform the intelligence
committees “in a timely fashion,” along with providing justification for not
notifying them earlier.171
Over the years, the Intelligence Oversight Act has been just as riddled as
the War Powers Resolution with noncompliance and arguments over
separation of powers.172 From early assertions that “[t]o the extent a covert
165. Id. at 139. Prior to the Desert One raid to recover the U.S. personnel from Iran,
“members of Congress, including the leadership, were not consulted or informed in advance
of either the preparatory activities or the mission itself. In such a context, the constitutional
moment occurred when the president considered and decided not to consult or advise the
Congress of these actions.” BAKER, supra note 29, at 67.
166. These tools include authorization and appropriation, nomination of leaders,
congressional hearings, investigations, treaty ratification, and the Government
Accountability Office. See ERIC ROSENBACH & AKI J. PERITZ, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L
AFFAIRS, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH., CONFRONTATION OR COLLABORATION? CONGRESS AND
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 20–21 (2009), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.
harvard.edu/files/IC-book-finalasof12JUNE.pdf; Legislative Oversight of Intelligence, CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-anation/intelligence-oversight/legislative-oversight-of-intelligence.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2015).
167. Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975, 1981–82 (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C.).
168. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a) (2014); see also ROSENBACH & PERITZ, supra note 166, at 28–
30.
169. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(1)–(2).
170. See id. § 3093(c)(2). This group comprises the so-called Gang of Eight. KOH, supra
note 58, at 58.
171. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(3).
172. See KOH, supra note 58, at 58–60; see also James F. Basile, Congressional
Assertiveness, Executive Authority and the Intelligence Oversight Act: A New Threat to the
Separation of Powers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 571, 580 (1989) (“[T]hose who conduct
foreign policy cannot be subject to the regularity of legal norms. Quick action in response to
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action is analogous to a military action, . . . the President as Commander-inChief retains complete control over” a given operation,173 to debates over
whether CIA drone strikes constitute covert actions,174 the executive branch
has repeatedly sought to confine the scope of congressional control over
covert actions. Likewise, Congress has attempted to tie intelligence
appropriations to committee oversight of CIA interrogation techniques and
warrantless surveillance.175
3. Presidential Control of Wartime
Prisoner Detention and Recovery Policy
Another area in which concerns over separation of powers have played
out is the disposition and treatment of enemy captives during times of
armed conflict, as well as the often-related efforts to recover U.S.
Historical analysis is especially relevant here, as the
captives.176
controversy over which political branch should exert control over detainee
policy has never come directly before the Supreme Court.177 Further, as
Justice Frankfurter wrote in Youngstown, “a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’
vested in the President.”178 Congressional deference to presidential
decisions on the treatment and disposition of enemy captives and the proper
methods of recovering American prisoners seems to provide just such a
“gloss.”179
This section explores the history of American treatment of enemy
captives and efforts at recovering U.S. servicemembers. These examples
fluid situations cannot be slowed by the legal restraints normally imposed on other policy
areas.”).
173. Barron & Lederman, supra note 29, at 1083–84 (quoting Oversight Legislation:
Hearings on S. 1721 and S. 1818 Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 100th Cong.
181–82 (1987) (statement of Charles Cooper, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel)).
174. See Todd C. Huntley & Andrew D. Levitz, Controlling the Use of Power in the
Shadows: Challenges in the Application of Jus In Bello to Clandestine and Unconventional
Warfare Activities, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461, 467 (2014).
175. See ROSENBACH & PAVITZ, supra note 166, at 25.
176. The term “captive” is intentionally ambiguous, describing both prisoners of war,
who must be afforded full protections under the United States’ international obligations, and
other detainees, whose legal status is either uncertain or does not entitle them to the full
extent of these protections. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
Additionally, “[t]he President’s power as Commander in Chief to dispose of the liberty of
individuals captured during military engagements is not limited to those who are entitled to
prisoner of war status.” Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 20 (Mar. 13, 2002),
available at https://ccrjustice.org/files/memorandum03132002.pdf.
177. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636–37 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(explaining that the Court has jurisdiction over detainee controversies only if they involve
conflicts over statutory regulations).
178. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
179. Id.; see also Pearlstein, supra note 18, at 629–30.

2858

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

focus on nontraditional detainees while offering a comprehensive view of
the longstanding tradition of presidential control over detainee policy in
conflicts large and small, against a variety of both state and non-state actors,
within the United States and around the world. The President often has
executed prisoner transfers and releases as part of a broader effort to
repatriate American captives, a policy over which he has consistently
exercised exclusive control.
a. The Revolutionary War
Under the British model from which the colonists derived their
understanding of a commander in chief, “the Crown had absolute authority
to dispose as it saw fit of prisoners of war and other detainees.”180 Once the
Revolutionary War erupted, British field commanders, not their civilian
counterparts, executed local control over POW policy by acting under the
authority of the King.181 As Commander in Chief of the Continental Army,
George Washington mirrored this approach by taking responsibility for the
treatment of over 14,000 captured enemy soldiers and sailors.182 A system
of local prisoner exchanges developed early in the Revolution and quickly
became essential to the reciprocal treatment of POWs.183 Within this
system, senior officers “were usually exchanged by direct correspondence
and agreements between General Washington” and British military
leadership with little to no input from Congress.184
The only exception seems to have arisen in the case of the “Convention
Army,” a unit of almost 6000 British, Hessian, and Canadian captives
designated for transport to and release in Canada under an agreement
reached in the field between American and British generals.185 Congress,
however, refused to acknowledge the agreement, likely balking at the sheer
number of captives who would be set free and the gentlemanly
circumstances under which it was negotiated.186 Instead, “a jurisdictional
dispute” emerged between Congress and the American general who
180. John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1203 (2004). But
see PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 168–74 (2010)
(arguing that the British judiciary oversaw the detention conditions of prisoners of war and
regularly considered applications for their release).
181. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1204.
182. See ROBERT C. DOYLE, THE ENEMY IN OUR HANDS: AMERICA’S TREATMENT OF
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERROR 11–12 (2010).
183. See id. The exchange system, although decentralized, became the most efficient
means for disposing of prisoners. See PAUL J. SPRINGER, AMERICA’S CAPTIVES: TREATMENT
OF POWS FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 41 (2010) (“[A]ny
efforts made to utilize prisoners for any purpose other than exchange proved mostly
counterproductive.”).
184. DOYLE, supra note 182, at 13. Indeed, captured “British officer[s] . . . often received
paroles of honor within a designated area and, at their own expense, found quarters in private
homes or inns while they awaited exchange.” Id. at 30; see also SPRINGER, supra note 183, at
15 (“Washington was under the command of Congress, but he was given great leeway in the
daily operations of [prisoner] policies.”).
185. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 15–16; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 21–22.
186. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 16; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 22.
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brokered the deal, with only the British leader and several of his staff
officers—the most valuable detainees according to the metric in place at the
time—being released.187 Commanders gradually arranged for the exchange
of the rest of the “Convention Army” over the course of the War, however,
without further congressional interruption.188 This episode is also notable
for the intentional grouping of mercenary Hessian forces, who were not
representing a state party to the conflict, with British regulars, who
represented the Crown.189
b. The Civil War
By the commencement of the Civil War, the trend toward decentralized
military execution of detainee policy dictated by the President as
Commander in Chief had been cemented through conflicts of various
intensities.190 As such, detainees held by the Union, whether military or
civilian, were “subject to the exclusive control of the President” through the
intermediaries of cabinet officials and field officers.191
Parole, or the release of enemy prisoners on the condition that they not
reengage in hostilities, became customary during the first several years of
the war despite Union refusal to recognize Confederate forces as
representatives of a sovereign state.192 In 1864, however, recognizing that
paroles and exchanges undermined the Union’s manpower advantage,
Secretary of War Edwin Stanton and General Ulysses Grant forbade both
practices without any congressional consultation, notification, or
opposition.193
c. World War II
In the opening years of World War II, the Allied Powers mostly used
enemy captives as cheap sources of labor on the front in which they were
captured.194 As the war progressed, President Franklin Roosevelt, in
consultation with the Secretary of War and the newly created War
Manpower Commission, experimented with a new policy: the transfer of
captives from Europe to camps on American soil, primarily around cities
187. DOYLE, supra note 182, at 16.
188. See id. at 25. “Congress issued contradictory orders that were often ignored by field
commanders and state governments.” SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 15.
189. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 23.
190. See, e.g., id. at 124–25 (describing the ordeals of members of the Arapaho,
Comanche, Kiowa, and Cheyenne tribes who had been captured during the Indian Wars but
could not “be held as prisoners of war or be indicted for anything at all”); Yoo, supra note
180, at 1206–10 (discussing prisoner policy during the Quasi-War with France in the late
eighteenth century and concluding that Congress “provide[d] no substantive standards [for
prisoner exchanges], and expressly le[ft] all prisoner exchanges to the complete discretion of
the President”).
191. Yoo, supra note 180, at 1213.
192. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 89, 92.
193. See id. at 94. The Union paroled or exchanged at least twice as many Confederate
troops as the Confederacy did Union troops. See id. at 111.
194. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1217–18.
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along the eastern seaboard.195 All told, the War Department housed
425,000 enemy captives in hundreds of camps throughout the United States,
with German soldiers comprising the majority of the captured
population.196 This system remained in effect for the duration of the war
without any congressional opposition, despite repeated escapes and the
heightened risk of domestic sabotage.197
d. The Vietnam War
Starting with the Westmoreland-Co Agreement in 1965, the United
States contracted to transfer all enemy captives in the Vietnam War,
regardless of status, to South Vietnamese control.198 This development, a
formal arrangement between the commander of American forces in country
and the South Vietnamese Minister of Defense, marked a continuation of
the overall trend toward local or regional military control over enemy
captives in support of a broader policy articulated at the executive level.199
Once this framework had been established, American officials began to
pursue the return of American captives.200 From covert raids to more
transparent measures such as exchanges, no option seemed to be completely
off the table.201 One State Department proposal included offering ransom
by transferring funds directly to the North Vietnamese in exchange for the
release of American prisoners.202 The Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately
rejected the idea, however, citing concerns over the dangerous precedential
value and the propaganda exploitations of such an approach.203 As one
historian notes, “[a]doption of ransom as the official policy of the U.S.
government received no further serious consideration, then or later.”204
Prisoner exchanges offered a more viable option, although only after the
United States offered a clandestine channel for negotiations to take place
with the Viet Cong.205 When the South Vietnamese government found out
about the negotiations, however, the United States denied any involvement
and reiterated its refusal to negotiate with non-state actors like the Viet
Cong.206 Instead, reciprocal release, “a de facto, informal exchange” in
195. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 179–80; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 151–61.
196. See Arnold Krammer, Japanese Prisoners of War in America, 52 PAC. HIST. REV.
67, 67 (1983).
197. See DOYLE, supra note 182, at 182, 193–94; SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 155–61.
198. See VERNON E. DAVIS, THE LONG ROAD HOME: U.S. PRISONER OF WAR POLICY AND
PLANNING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 91–92 (2000). The United States recognized neither the
Communist government’s regular soldiers nor the Viet Cong as sovereign state actors. See
DOYLE, supra note 182, at 269.
199. See DAVIS, supra note 198, at 91.
200. See id. at 85–112.
201. See generally GEORGE J. VEITH, CODE-NAME BRIGHT LIGHT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
U.S. POW RESCUE EFFORTS DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1998).
202. See DAVIS, supra note 198, at 104–05.
203. See id. at 104.
204. Id. at 105.
205. See id. at 101–02.
206. See id. at 103. As a result, the release of only two Americans could definitively be
traced to these efforts. See id.
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which “one party to a conflict returns one or more prisoners of war to the
other side in the hope that the enemy will respond by freeing a
corresponding number of captives,” became the rule for the rest of the
war.207 This system tilted mostly in favor of the Northern Vietnamese and
Viet Cong, many more of whom were released than Americans and South
Vietnamese.208
In terms of POW policy during the Vietnam War, congressional action
was initially limited to comments from “individual members, speaking
about the problems of POW/MIA families among their constituencies or
reacting to an isolated event in the current news.”209 Starting in 1969 with
the implementation of DOD’s “Go Public Campaign,”210 Congress used
rallies, floor speeches, and formal statements to try to raise awareness of the
abuses being suffered by American captives.211 This movement eventually
culminated in the passage, unanimously in both Houses, of a resolution
protesting prisoner treatment and urging the North Vietnamese government
to honor the framework established in the Geneva Conventions.212 The
resolution also “approve[d] and endorse[d] efforts by the United States
Government” to work toward the release of American servicemembers,
even though at that point the executive branch continued to handle all
negotiations.213 This trend continued throughout the rest of the peace
process, which involved extensive discussions on the proper disposition of
captured servicemembers.214 Although some members of Congress
travelled to Paris to participate in negotiations, they did so as individuals.215
Institutional participation by Congress never rose to the level of negotiating
or overseeing U.S. recovery efforts.216

207. Id. at 90; see also SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 188.
208. See DAVIS, supra note 198, at 93 (“[T]he U.S. reciprocity policy, when pursued in
tandem with a refractory South Vietnamese government, could hardly be counted a
success.”); DOYLE, supra note 182, at 291.
209. DAVIS, supra note 198, at 211.
210. Id. at 199.
211. Id. at 211.
212. See id. at 212.
213. Id.; see also id. at 453–90. These negotiations included secret meetings between
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and high-level Vietnamese officials of which
Congress was unaware. See id. at 468, 470. Seven months later, in October 1970, President
Nixon announced a five-part plan for peace with the North Vietnamese, the last prong of
which included “the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both
sides,” again without congressional objection. Id. at 539.
214. “As the president’s plenipotentiary in the negotiations, Kissinger retained exclusive
control.” Id. at 489. Senator George S. McGovern, in acknowledging that the President
retained control over prisoner repatriation policy under his authority as Commander in Chief,
stated that “[i]n a very real sense President Nixon holds the key to the jail cells of Hanoi.” Id.
at 471.
215. See id. at 214.
216. See id. at 486 (explaining that the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, staffed by
representatives from DOD, and the International Commission of Control and Supervision,
which did not have any American members, arranged the logistics of prisoner returns to the
United States and North Vietnam).
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e. The Global War on Terror Before 2009
The Global War on Terror, commenced after the attacks of September
11, 2001, has been no exception to the historical practice of presidential
discretion in handling detainee and POW exchange policies.217 After some
internal debate, the administration of President George W. Bush declared
that al Qaeda and Taliban forces taken captive in Afghanistan were nonstate actors and therefore not privy to the same protections as POWs.218
Housed at Guantánamo Bay, the detainees dwelled in legal limbo as the
administration struggled to define which protections it would afford them
instead of those granted by the Geneva Conventions.219 Congress remained
on the sideline for much of this conversation, passing the Detainee
Treatment Act220 and Military Commissions Act221 only after the revelation
of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and the striking down by the Supreme
Court of the judicial procedures settled on by the executive branch,
respectively.222
Indeed, “[t]o the limited extent that the legislative body was involved in
detention policy, Congress cooperated with the administration in the
effort . . . to give the president maximum flexibility and discretion to deal
with detainees as he saw fit.”223 From the first use of Guantánamo as a
detention facility in January 2002 until the establishment of Combatant
Status Review Tribunals three years later, the President transferred 142
detainees to other countries without any congressional input or
notification.224 In total, the Bush Administration transferred over 500
detainees from Guantánamo to foreign custody,225 with Congress “quick to
give the President whatever authority he asked for, exercising only the most
modest oversight” of detainee transfers.226 This policy of acquiescence
changed almost immediately after President Obama took office, as members

217. See Yoo, supra note 180, at 1235.
218. See KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100
DAYS 2–3 (2009); Neal Richardson & Spencer Crona, Detention of Terrorists As Unlawful
Combatants and Their Trial by American Military Commissions, in LAW IN THE WAR ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 123, 130–32 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 2005); see also Manooher
Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, “Unlawful Combatants” or “Prisoners of War”: The Law and
Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 59 (2003) (analyzing practical repercussions of the
administration’s decision).
219. See SPRINGER, supra note 183, at 196–97; see also Gregory P. Noone et al.,
Prisoners of War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 50 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 19–
21 (2004) (describing the use of naval vessels as temporary detainee sites during the early
phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom).
220. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd,
2000dd-1).
221. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10
U.S.C.).
222. See David J.R. Frakt, Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash
over Detainees and the Closure of Guantánamo, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 179, 187–89 (2012).
223. Id. at 183–84.
224. See id. at 185–86.
225. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203 (2009).
226. Frakt, supra note 222, at 188.
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of Congress expressed concern over the President’s executive order
requiring the closure of Guantánamo by January 2010.227
II. DID THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
TO EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR AN AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR
DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OR RELEASE
OF GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES?
The transfer of one million dollars and five Taliban detainees to Qatar in
exchange for the release of Sergeant Bergdahl seems to fall into the third
Youngstown category (i.e., executive authority at its nadir) because it
appears to contravene express congressional will. The power to negotiate
for the release of American prisoners of war, however, always has fallen
squarely within the President’s power as Commander in Chief,228 as has his
ability to determine the disposition of enemy captives.229 There would be
no question of the exchange’s constitutionality had Congress not attached
funding or notification restrictions to the transfer of detainees from
Guantánamo. Based on this, which authority takes priority, Congress’s
power to spend or the President’s power as Commander in Chief?
Part II.A considers the origins of the conflict between the Obama
Administration and Congress over the transfer of detainees from
Guantánamo to either domestic prisons or foreign control and describes the
legislative environment underlying the passage of the 2014 NDAA. Part
II.B looks at the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange itself, which was the
culmination of several years of negotiation between the United States and
the Taliban. Part II.C surveys the immediate congressional and executive
responses to the exchange before addressing the competing constitutional
claims made by Congress and the President.
A. Congressional Attempts to Control Detainee Policy
Through Its Power of the Purse
The use of facilities at the American naval station at Guantánamo Bay for
the detention of captives in the Global War on Terror was controversial
from the start.230 After diplomatic and security concerns led to the rejection
of prisons throughout Eastern Europe, Southwest Asia, the Pacific, and
even onboard ships at sea, the State Department also recoiled at transferring
detainees to American soil.231 The naval base at Guantánamo Bay, on the
227. See id. at 192–93.
228. See supra Part I.C.3.
229. See Pearlstein, supra note 18, at 629. But see Frakt, supra note 222, at 233–37
(arguing that Congress has asserted control over detainee policy throughout U.S. history);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of Military Powers, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 299, 304, 321–24 (2008) (concluding that Congress has ultimate authority over the
scope of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief).
230. See GREENBERG, supra note 218, at 21; BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG
WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 72–78 (2008).
231. See GREENBERG, supra note 218, at 4–6 (describing consideration of plans to
transport several hundred al Qaeda and Taliban detainees to federal prisons in New York or
military brigs in South Carolina and Kansas).
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other hand, possessed several unique features—geographic isolation,
preexisting infrastructure, and freedom from diplomatic wrangling with a
potential host country—that could prove beneficial as the United States
sorted out the detainees’ legal status.232 As Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld explained, “I would characterize Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as the
least worst place we could have selected.”233
Over the next several years, legal and human rights analysts challenged
both the conditions of the detention site and the nature of the detention
itself.234 By the 2008 election, the issue had attracted so much attention
that closing Guantánamo became a core component of then-candidate
Barack Obama’s platform.235 Seeking to fulfill his campaign promises,
President Obama issued an executive order on his second full day in the
White House directing the closure of the detention facilities at Guantánamo
Bay within a year.236 Obama also ordered a review of the detainees’ cases,
with an eye toward filtering out detainees who no longer posed a threat or
would not eventually be prosecuted.237 Obama’s decision was praised by
human rights groups but condemned by Republicans in Congress, who
feared that the new policy could lead to the transfer of detainees to the
United States.238
Part II.A.1 examines the ways in which Congress enshrined its
opposition to Guantánamo’s closure in defense spending bills throughout
Obama’s first term. Part II.A.2 looks specifically at the 2014 NDAA,
which the administration allegedly violated by failing to notify Congress
thirty days before transferring five Taliban detainees as part of the Bergdahl
exchange.
1. The Increasingly Contentious Legislative Environment Surrounding
Guantánamo Detainees: 2009–2013
The program initially proceeded according to plan as various countries
agreed to accept former Guantánamo detainees, and citizens of Afghanistan,
Chad, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen were repatriated by
their country of origin.239 However, likely in response to the federal trial of

232. See id. at 6–7.
233. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def., DOD News Briefing (Dec. 27,
2001), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2696.
234. See, e.g., WITTES, supra note 230, at 72–78.
235. See The Candidates on Military Tribunals and Guantánamo Bay, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 24, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/world/candidates-militarytribunals-Guantanamo-bay/p14751.
236. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205 (2009).
237. See id. at 204.
238. See Peter Baker & David Johnston, Guantánamo Deadline May Be Missed, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A27; Mark Mazzetti & William Glaberson, Obama Will Shut
Guantánamo Site and C.I.A. Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1.
239. See Frakt, supra note 222, at 195–96; The Guantánamo Docket: Timeline: 2009,
N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2009 (last visited Mar. 25,
2015).

2015]

PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN PRISONER EXCHANGES

2865

one of the embassy bombers,240 Congress used the 2009 Supplemental
Appropriations Act to prohibit the use of defense funds for the release or
transfer of any Guantánamo detainees “into the continental United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of Columbia.”241
The Act further required the President to submit—both to Congress and
to the governor of the proposed host state—a plan for relocation or transfer
to an American prison, taking into account such factors as cost and risk to
national security.242 The statute also placed limitations on the transfer of
any detainee to his country of origin or any other foreign country, although
the fifteen-day notification requirement for doing so was a significantly
lower barrier than that applied to domestic transfers.243 The President did
not raise any objections to these measures in his signing statement.244
The effort to close Guantánamo lost significant momentum after an
attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009, caused Obama to suspend
the repatriation of scores of detainees to Yemen.245 The flood of transfers
and releases from Guantánamo, which peaked at 122 in 2007,246 slowed to
a trickle by 2010, when only twenty-four detainees left the compound
permanently,247 and dried up completely in 2011, when just one detainee
was transferred (and none after January).248 This trend likely reflected
growing congressional opposition to such transfers.249
a. The 2010 and 2011 NDAAs
The 2010 NDAA included the same consultation and notification
requirements contained in the 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, but it

240. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Ahmed Ghailani Verdict Stirs Debate, POLITICO (Jan. 26,
2011, 6:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48176.html.
241. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(a), 123 Stat. 1859,
1920 (2009). This restriction stood in marked contrast to the importation of hundreds of
thousands of enemy captives into the United States during World War II. See supra Part
I.C.3.c.
242. See § 14103(d), 123 Stat. at 1920–21.
243. See § 14103(e), 123 Stat. at 1921.
244. See Presidential Statement on Signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009,
1 PUB. PAPERS 910 (June 24, 2009). For a discussion of the validity of presidential signing
statements, see Louis Fisher, Signing Statements: Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 183 (2007).
245. See Andrea J. Prasow, The Yemenis at Guantánamo, SLATE (Mar. 30, 2014, 8:15
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/salim_hamdan
_and_the_yemeni_prisoners_who_can_t_leave_the_prison_at_guant.html. Congress did not
object to this unilateral exercise of presidential discretion over detainee policy, presumably
because Obama was deciding to retain control over the detainees rather than send them back
to Yemen. See id.
246. See The Guantánamo Docket:
Timeline:
2007, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2007 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
247. See Frakt, supra note 222, at 202; The Guantánamo Docket: Timeline: 2010, N.Y.
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2010 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
248. See Frakt, supra note 222, at 203; The Guantánamo Docket: Timeline: 2011, N.Y.
TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2011 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
249. See, e.g., Frakt, supra note 222, at 202, 205–06, 217–18 (identifying congressional
restrictions as one of several factors contributing to the decline in transfers).
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also lifted the repatriation ban.250 This decision was indicative of
Congress’s underlying emphasis on barring transfers to the United States,
which it considered an unnecessary security risk.251 The following year, in
the 2011 NDAA, Congress responded to the Justice Department’s proposal
to federally prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed, “the self-described
mastermind of the Sept[ember] 11 attacks,”252 by specifically naming him
as one of the detainees who may not be transferred to America.253
Additionally, section 1032 of the 2011 NDAA prohibited the use of funds
for the construction of detainee facilities within the United States, again as
an attempt to forestall Obama’s announced plan to bring some of the
detainees to U.S. territory.254
Yet the most significant change to congressional policy that year came in
section 1033, which established strict certification requirements for the
transfer of detainees to foreign countries.255 Under this provision, the
Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, would
have to ensure that the proposed recipient of the detainee, whether or not it
was his country of origin, could effectively control the detainee and prevent
him from posing a threat to the United States.256 This certification was due
no later than thirty days before the proposed transfer.257 The only
exception applied to transfers made “to effectuate an order affecting the
disposition of the individual that is issued by a court or competent tribunal
of the United States having lawful jurisdiction,” which would only require
“prompt[]” congressional notification.258
President Obama formally expressed his displeasure with these
constraints in the signing statement that accompanied the 2011 NDAA.259
He first deplored section 1032, which refused funding for construction or
modification of detention centers in the United States, as “a dangerous and
unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority to determine

250. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
§ 1041(b), (d), 123 Stat. 2190, 2455 (2009).
251. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H8772–73 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Phil Gingrey) (“Those that seek to do us harm should never be transferred to our soil or tried
in our Federal court system. . . . Simply put, the American people believe that bringing
Guantánamo Bay detainees to American soil—for any purpose—puts Americans at risk and
is a national security threat.”).
252. Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.
253. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, § 1034, 124 Stat. 4137, 4353 (2011). Some debate continues over whether this
approach constitutes a “bill of attainder,” which the Constitution expressly forbids Congress
from issuing. See, e.g., Frakt, supra note 222, at 245–48 (evaluating the strengths and
weaknesses of the bill of attainder argument).
254. See Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. at 4351; Peter Slevin, Illinois Prison
Picked for Detainees: Congress Must Vote on Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, at A3.
255. See Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1033, 124 Stat. at 4351–52.
256. See id. § 1033(b), 124 Stat. at 4351–52.
257. See id. § 1033(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 4351–52.
258. Id. § 1033(a)(2), 124 Stat. at 4351–52.
259. Presidential Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 1 PUB. PAPERS 7 (Jan. 7, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Statement].
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when and where to prosecute Guantánamo detainees.”260 With regard to
section 1033, which laid out the certification requirements for transfer to
foreign countries, Obama admonished Congress for “interfer[ing] with the
authority of the executive branch to make important and consequential
foreign policy and national security determinations regarding whether and
under what circumstances” the President may transfer detainees.261 Obama
then placed the transfers within the context of his broader power to conduct
foreign affairs, arguing that the executive branch must retain “the ability to
act swiftly and to have broad flexibility” in negotiating with other countries,
a power that section 1033 severely restricted.262 Acknowledging the need
to fund military operations in the midst of two wars, the President still
signed the bill despite these objections, although he also vowed to dampen
their impact while seeking their repeal.263
b. The 2012 NDAA
The 2012 NDAA included all of these provisions in exact or slightly
modified form, even after some of the concerns Congress was guarding
against dissipated.264 In April 2011, the Department of Justice announced
that it would no longer prosecute Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four of his
coconspirators in federal district court, “reluctantly” handing the case back
to DOD to be pursued via military commission instead.265 Attorney
General Eric Holder cited congressional opposition, and specifically the
“series of barriers” erected through the preceding NDAAs, as the primary
reason for DOJ’s shift in strategy.266 Senator Mitch McConnell, the Senate
minority leader at the time, welcomed the news, announcing on the floor
that Congress had achieved its primary objective of isolating dangerous
detainees from the United States and keeping them out of the federal court
system, where he feared they would be afforded too many protections.267
He did not mention the transfer of detainees abroad, either for repatriation

260. Id. For additional analysis, see Frakt, supra note 222, at 214–218 (“[T]he consensus
among national security scholars and administration officials on the cumulative effect of
these conditions is that Congress has made it nearly impossible to release detainees, at least
to their home country.”).
261. 2011 Statement, supra note 259, at 7.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 7–8.
264. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1026 (prohibiting funds for construction or modification of detention facilities in the
United States), § 1027 (prohibiting funds for transfer or release within the United States),
§ 1028 (requiring certification of recipient country and thirty days prior notification of
proposed transfer), 125 Stat. 1298, 1566–69 (2011).
265. Peter Finn, Sept. 11 Suspects Will Be Tried by a Military Panel, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
2011, at A1.
266. Id.
267. See 157 CONG. REC. S2064 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2011) (“For the sake of the safety and
the security of the American people, I am glad the President reconsidered his position on
how and where to try these detai[n]ees.”).
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or supervision by a third country, which seemed to have remained at most
an ancillary concern.268
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) voiced the White
House’s disapproval of the 2012 NDAA much earlier in the legislative
process, issuing a “Statement of Administration Policy” regarding House
Resolution 1540 (the precursor to the NDAA) in May 2011.269 Reinforcing
many of the arguments made in President Obama’s earlier signing
statement, OMB concluded that the proposed restrictions on the transfer of
detainees to foreign countries would “interfere[] with the authority of the
Executive branch to make important foreign policy and national security
determinations regarding whether and under what circumstances such
transfers should occur.”270 OMB also objected to the new review system,
arguing that it would unnecessarily disrupt the framework the President
instituted with his 2009 executive order.271 In November, OMB issued a
similar statement in response to Senate Resolution 1867, echoing the claims
of interference with executive branch authority and cautioning that “the
detention provisions in this bill micromanage the work of our experienced
counterterrorism professionals, including our military commanders,
intelligence professionals, seasoned counterterrorism prosecutors, or other
operatives in the field.”272
President Obama signed the 2012 NDAA into law on December 31,
2011, using his signing statement to further explain several of his
reservations.273 For the first time, President Obama also directly raised a
separation of powers argument, writing that the legislature’s move
amounted to a usurpation of his executive authority while also advising
Congress that his administration would interpret the NDAA provisions to
avoid such a constitutional conflict.274 The President’s claims, however,
did not speak to the congressional use of funding restrictions to achieve its
ends of detainee policy oversight.275 Meanwhile, four detainees left
Guantánamo in 2011: one was transferred to Algeria and three died in
detention.276

268. See id.
269. The report also addressed other hot-button issues at the time, such as the pursuit of
an alternative engine design for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and congressional efforts to
impede the repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010. See generally Statement
of Admin. Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, H.R. 1540—National Defense Authorization
Act for FY 2012 (May 24, 2011), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf.
270. Id. at 2.
271. See id. at 2–3.
272. Statement of Admin. Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, S. 1867—National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 2012 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_20111117.pdf.
273. Presidential Statement by the President on Signing the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 31, 2011).
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See The Guantánamo Docket: Timeline: 2011, supra note 248.
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c. The 2013 NDAA
The following year brought more of the same. The House introduced
several new reporting requirements, such as notification within five days
when individuals were detained onboard naval vessels277 and notification
no later than ten days before the transfer of detainees from a coalition
facility in Parwan, Afghanistan, to either Afghan or foreign control.278
OMB issued its response in May 2012, reminding Congress that the Obama
Administration still opposed restrictions on the President’s discretion to
transfer or release detainees from Guantánamo.279 Section 1041 (later
ratified as section 1025), which restricted transfers from Parwan,
particularly incensed the White House, which called it “an unprecedented,
unwarranted, and misguided intrusion into the military’s detention
operations” that could “micromanage the decisions of experienced military
commanders and diplomats . . . [and] compromise the Executive’s ability to
act swiftly and flexibly during a critical time for transition in
Afghanistan.”280 This assessment seemed to be validated by reports that
spring on the local, informal prisoner exchanges that regularly took place
during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.281
The Senate’s version of the bill, as well as the final form presented to the
President, kept these new regulations mostly in place.282 So, once again,
President Obama signed the 2013 NDAA but expressed serious concerns
about some of its provisions.283 Section 1025 posed the most egregious
constitutional violation, he posited, because it “could interfere with [his]
ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about
the appropriate disposition of detainees.”284 The new requirements also
ignored the long tradition of “[d]ecisions regarding the disposition of
detainees captured on foreign battlefields” being made by military
commanders and national security professionals, not members of
Congress.285 Finally, the President reiterated his objections to the
277. See H.R. 4310, 112th Cong. § 1040(a) (2012).
278. See id. § 1041.
279. See Statement of Admin. Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, H.R. 4310—National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 (May 15, 2012), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr4310r_2012051
5.pdf.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Michael Hastings, America’s Last Prisoner of War, ROLLING STONE, June
7, 2012, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/americas-last-prisoner-ofwar-20120607 (“Prisoner exchanges take place at the ground level all the time in
Afghanistan, and Gen. David Petraeus, now the head of the CIA, has pointed out in
discussions about [Bergdahl] that U.S. forces made distasteful swaps in Iraq.”).
282. Notification for at sea detention extended to thirty days, for example. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1025, 126 Stat.
1632, 1913 (2012).
283. See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 2, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
Statement].
284. Id.
285. Id. For further analysis, see also REISS, supra note 71, at 11–12; Hastings, supra
note 281; supra Part I.C.
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restrictions on transfers or releases from Guantánamo because they
hindered his ability to conduct foreign affairs and act decisively as
Commander in Chief.286 Four detainees were transferred from Guantánamo
in 2012: one was repatriated to his home country of Sudan, one was
transferred to Canada, and two resettled in El Salvador after being released
by a federal judge.287 The President seemed to have complied with the
congressional notification requirements in each of these cases.288
2. The 2014 NDAA: Congressional Limitations on Guantánamo Transfers
and the Obama Administration’s Response
The 2014 NDAA loosened some of the transfer restrictions enacted in
2012 and 2013, most notably the prohibition on transfers to countries with
even a single instance of recidivism among its hosted detainees.289
Congress also enumerated several factors to be considered by the Secretary
of Defense prior to determining the suitability of a detainee for transfer or
release, which included the recommendations of the President’s review task
force.290 Recognizing that these modifications were “an improvement over
current law and . . . a welcome step toward closing” the Guantánamo
detention facility, the President still objected to the notification requirement
because of its potential to hinder negotiations with foreign countries
regarding detainee transfers.291 Obama also questioned the constitutionality
of section 1034, which denied funds for the transfer of any detainees to the
United States, on the grounds that its interference with his executive
discretion on where to prosecute alleged terrorists violated separation of
powers principles.292 Just as in previous years, the President did not heed
calls from his advisors to veto the bill,293 instead writing that the
286. 2013 Statement, supra note 283.
287. See Charlie Savage, Pair of Guantánamo Detainees Freed, the First in 15 Months,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2012, at A8; The Guantánamo Docket: Timeline: 2012, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2012 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
288. See H.R. Res. 644, 113th Cong. (Sept. 9, 2014) (“Whereas the Obama administration
has complied with the law in all other detainee transfers from GTMO since the date of the
enactment of prevailing law . . . .”); Savage, supra note 287 (noting that Congress knew
about the September detainee transfer to Canada as early as April).
289. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1035, 127 Stat. 672, 851–53 (2013).
290. Id. § 1035(c), 127 Stat. at 851–53 .
291. Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2014, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. 1 (Dec. 26, 2013) [hereinafter 2014 Statement].
President Obama also reiterated several policy arguments for the closure of Guantánamo,
such as its cost, effect on U.S. standing abroad, and incitement of violent extremists. See id.
The President echoed this theme in his 2014 State of the Union Address, the first time he
mentioned Guantánamo in that forum since his speech to the joint session of Congress five
years earlier. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014); President
Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009).
292. See 2014 Statement, supra note 291.
293. OMB argued that transfer restrictions “in the context of an ongoing armed conflict
may interfere with the Executive Branch’s ability to determine the appropriate disposition of
detainees and to make important foreign policy and national security determinations.”
Statement of Admin. Policy, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, H.R. 1960—National Defense
Authorization
Act
for
FY
2014
(June
11,
2013),
available
at
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Administration would implement sections 1034 and 1035 “in a manner that
avoids the constitutional conflict.”294
The 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act,295 passed shortly after the
NDAA and including what the GAO refers to as the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, reinforced many of the NDAA’s transfer
restrictions.296 Of note, section 8111 of the CAA granted the Pentagon
permission to use its appropriated funds to transfer a Guantánamo detainee
to a foreign country only if the Secretary of Defense complied with section
1035 of the NDAA.297 Section 1035, in turn, required congressional
notification no later than thirty days before the transfer, including “[a]
detailed statement of the basis for the transfer or release[,] . . . [a]n
explanation of why the transfer or release is in the national security interests
of the United States[,] . . . [and a] description of any actions taken to
mitigate the risks of reengagement by the individual to be transferred or
released.”298
These requirements, listed under the “Counterterrorism” subtitle of
Section X in the NDAA, explicitly link congressional concerns about the
closure of Guantánamo with the broader effort against al Qaeda and related
groups.299 The primary nonpolitical motivation for keeping Guantánamo
open appeared to have been fear of recidivism, with members of Congress
citing various cases of detainees returning to the battlefield after being
released.300 Although ongoing assessments by the Director of National
Intelligence undermined many of these claims by showing that the
recidivism rate had declined steeply since President Obama took office and
instituted the review measures contained in Executive Order 13492,301

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saphr1960r_2013061
1.pdf.
294. 2014 Statement, supra note 291.
295. Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII, § 8111, 128 Stat. 5, 131 (2014).
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1035(d)(1)–(3), 127 Stat. 672, 853 (2013). This section designated each House’s Armed
Services, Foreign Affairs/Relations, Appropriations, and Intelligence Committees as the
recipients of the notification. Id. § 1035(e), 127 Stat. at 853.
299. Id. §§ 1031–1039, 127 Stat. at 849–856.
300. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S8162 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2013) (remarks of Sen. Saxby
Chambliss) (“The recidivism rate is nearly 29 percent and has been climbing steadily since
detainees began being released from Guantanamo.”) Senator Chambliss also alleged that
former Guantánamo detainees had connections to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the
2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi, Libya. See id.
301. See Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba,
DIR.
OF
NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE
(Sept.
2013),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/September_2013_GTMO_Reengagement_UNCLASS_
Release_FINAL.pdf; Glenn Kessler, Spinning How Many Guantánamo Detainees Have
“Returned
to
the
Fight,”
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
21,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2013/11/21/spinning-how-manyguantanamo-detainees-have-returned-to-the-fight/.
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sensational cases still emerged.302 Either way, the link between the
viability of Guantánamo and ongoing military funding remained specious:
of the nine provisions in the Counterterrorism subtitle, not one mentioned
the conduct of military operations, which were addressed in detail
throughout the rest of the NDAA.303 The only mention of POWs came in
section 581, under “Subtitle I—Other Matters,” which ordered an
assessment of the economic efficiencies to be gained from shifting the Joint
POW/MIA Command to the direct control of the Secretary of Defense.304
In contrast, Sensitive Military Operations, the subtitle that immediately
followed Counterterrorism, established a new congressional oversight
mechanism but provided a very different reporting framework for missions
similar in scale to the Bergdahl recovery.305 Defined as “a lethal operation
or capture operation conducted by the armed forces,” a sensitive military
operation required only post hoc notification to the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees.306 Furthermore, missions of this type
conducted within “a theater of major hostilities” were entirely exempt from
the reporting requirement.307 Unlike the thirty-day lead time required for
the transfer of a Guantánamo detainee, DOD did not have to inform
Congress of a sensitive military operation until after it occurred, and there
was no specific deadline by which the notification must have been sent.308
This effort toward executive accountability to the legislative branch was
counterbalanced by the overall shift toward flexible funding in DOD budget
apportionment over the same period.309 Of the $625.1 billion appropriated
in the 2014 NDAA, for example, $80.7 billion went to overseas
contingency operations (OCO), a supplemental pot of money originally
used only for the Global War on Terror.310 Although the NDAA did not
specifically define overseas contingency operations, DOD guidance
302. See, e.g., Terrence McCoy, The Mystery Man Who Is the World’s Top Jihadist,
WASH. POST, June 12, 2014, at A15 (reporting that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi spent four years in
American custody in Iraq before assuming leadership of the Islamic State).
303. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§§ 1031–1039, 127 Stat. 672, 849–56 (2013).
304. See id. § 581(c)(2)(C)(ii), 127 Stat. at 774.
305. See id. §§ 1041–1043, 127 Stat. at 856–58.
306. Id. § 1041(d), 127 Stat. at 856.
307. Id. As one scholar notes, this was “presumably on the theory that Afghanistan for
now at least remains a zone of combat operations, meaning that there would be both too
many such operations to justify this sort of each-time reporting, and that the circumstances
of such operations in [a] combat zone” do not warrant as high a degree of legislative
scrutiny. Robert Chesney, Important New Oversight Legislation for Military Kill/Capture
Outside
Afghanistan,
LAWFARE
(May
9,
2013,
12:24
AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/important-new-oversight-legislation-for-militarykillcapture-outside-afghanistan/.
308. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66,
§ 1041(a), 127 Stat. at 856 (“The Secretary of Defense shall promptly submit to the
congressional defense committees notice in writing of any sensitive military operation
conducted under this title following such operation.”).
309. See Julia Harte, The Pentagon’s Slush Fund, POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/omnibus-bill-pentagon-slush-fund113517.html.
310. 159 CONG. REC. H7894 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2013).
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suggested that the money must have some type of hook to a region of active
combat operations, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or “[g]eographic areas in
which combat or direct combat support operations . . . occur.”311 Over the
years, however, the link between OCO spending and actual wartime needs
has become increasingly tenuous, with some critics arguing that the base
budget/OCO distinction is merely a trick to avoid mandatory spending
caps.312 In 2014, for example, Congress allotted $5 billion more in OCO
funds than the Pentagon had requested, much of it only tangentially related
to the war.313 Congress also scrutinizes less strictly OCO appropriations,
presumably because the money is supposed to be supporting frontline
operations.314
Title IX of the 2014 CAA, Overseas Contingency Operations, allotted
approximately $32.4 billion to the Army’s “operations and maintenance”
fund, the account the Obama Administration used to pay the Qataris.315
Section 9005 of this title granted $30 million to the Commander’s
Emergency Response Program, which was designed to give military
commanders in Afghanistan the ability to respond to “urgent, small-scale”
crises within their areas of responsibility.316 In a nod to the discretion
necessary on the battlefield, any expenditure below $5 million would not
trigger congressional notification, and expenditures over that amount only
required fifteen-day notice to the relevant committees.317 The Act also
conditioned the use of OCO funds for aid to Pakistan on the satisfaction of
certain prerequisites by that country, as certified by the Secretaries of State
and Defense.318 Congress waived those restrictions as long as the
Secretaries submitted a report explaining that it was in the “national
security interest” of the United States to do so, but the CAA did not define a
timeline for the submission of such a report.319

311. Criteria for War/Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Requests, MARINE
CORPS LOGISTICS COMMAND, available at http://www.logcom.marines.mil/Portals/184/Docs/
Sites/prog_resources/files/afd/OCO-Guidance.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
312. See, e.g., Harte, supra note 309; Stephanie Gaskell, Pentagon Wants to Keep
Controversial War Budget Beyond Afghanistan, DEFENSE ONE (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/03/pentagon-wants-keep-controversial-warbudget-beyond-afghanistan/79972/.
313. Statement, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 293, at 3.
314. See Harte, supra note 309.
315. See Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. C, tit. VIII, § 8111, 128 Stat. 5, 134 (2014).
316. Id. § 9005, 128 Stat. at 147.
317. See id. This plan was echoed in the $63.8 million allotment to the Task Force for
Business and Stability Operations to carry out “strategic business and economic assistance
activities in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.” Id. § 9011, 128 Stat. at
148–49.
318. The conditions included combating terrorist threats, dismantling improvised
explosive device networks, and granting humanitarian assistance organizations access to the
country. See id. § 9014(a)(1)–(7), 128 Stat. at 149–50.
319. Id. § 9014(b), 128 Stat. at 150.
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B. The Exchange of Five Taliban Detainees
for a Captured U.S. Soldier in May 2014
Questions remain over the exact circumstances of then-Private First Class
Bergdahl’s disappearance from his post in Paktika Province, Afghanistan,
on June 30, 2009.320 His unit and others conducted various unsuccessful
searches over the next several months, growing in scope and duration to no
avail.321 The Taliban released two videos of Bergdahl during that time,
demanding the release of a “limited number of prisoners” in exchange for
his freedom.322 Contact between the U.S. government and the Taliban
remained intermittent, with no formal talks for the next two years.323
Yet the “Taliban Five,” as they have become known, were no strangers to
Congress.324 Indeed, as early as January 2012 four of them had been
identified by name in a House Resolution seeking to prohibit their release
from Guantánamo until Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader,
entered U.S. custody.325 This resolution came just days after the Obama
Administration first briefed members of Congress on the proposal,326 as
well as premature reports that the United States had exchanged Bergdahl for
three of the Taliban commanders.327 A month later, the Wall Street Journal
reported the “open secret” that Obama was considering releasing the five
detainees as “a goodwill gesture” ahead of potential peace talks with the
Taliban.328 As the newspaper presciently noted, “Congress can’t stop these
transfers, but it can raise a fuss.”329
The Obama Administration publicly confirmed the possibility of a
Bergdahl-Taliban exchange for the first time in May 2012, releasing details
of the proposed deal in response to reports that Bergdahl’s family had
begun communicating directly with the Taliban.330 Many of the terms of
this proposal, which were almost identical to those briefed to Congress in
late 2011 and early 2012, ended up in the final agreement two years later.331
320. Richard A Oppel, Jr., Bergdahl Details Disappearance to General Leading an
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2014, at A15.
321. See Charlie Savage & Andrew W. Lehren, Can G.I. Be Tied to 6 Lost Lives? Facts
Are Murky, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at A1.
322. Alissa J. Rubin, Taliban Release Video of American Soldier Captured in June in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at A4.
323. Bumiller & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
324. The Taliban Five, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204136404577209391708596680.
325. H.R. Res. 529, 112th Cong. (2012).
326. According to Speaker of the House John Boehner, DOD informed the relevant
committee chairs of the deal “in late 2011 and January 2012,” but soon “deferred further
engagement [with Congress] because the prospects of the exchange had diminished.” Press
Release, John Boehner, Speaker of the House, Statement on Congressional Concerns Raised
About Prisoner Exchange (June 3, 2014), available at http://www.speaker.gov/pressrelease/boehner-statement-congressional-concerns-raised-about-prisoner-exchange.
327. See M.K. Bhadrakumar, There’s More to Peace Than Taliban, ASIA TIMES ONLINE
(Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NA12Df01.html.
328. The Taliban Five, supra note 324.
329. Id.
330. See Bumiller & Rosenberg, supra note 18.
331. See id.
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Negotiations remained intermittent over the next year and a half, stalling
until a video proving that Bergdahl was still alive convinced the United
States to relent to Taliban demands for the simultaneous release of all five
detainees.332 As the White House acknowledged, this was the only instance
of a U.S. servicemember being formally exchanged with the enemy during
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.333
The process accelerated over the several weeks preceding the exchange,
as an agreement began to seem more plausible.334 Neither side publicized
the progress though, fearing that a leak could undermine the talks, nor did
they inform the Afghan government ahead of time, likely for the same
reason.335 Despite this, the deal did not come as a surprise in Afghanistan
once it was announced.336 On May 31, 2014, the day of the transfer, the
Secretary of Defense informed the required members of Congress of the
exchange via letter.337 Months later, DOD had not yet released details
about how Bergdahl became separated from his unit in the first place, nor
where and under what conditions he was held captive.338
C. The Controversy Surrounding the President’s Ability
to Conduct the Exchange
The immediate euphoria surrounding Bergdahl’s release quickly faded to
ambivalence over the price paid for his freedom and the means used to
secure it.339 The congressional response focused on the White House’s
failure to notify leaders of the transfer of the Taliban Five from
Guantánamo to Qatar, while the President emphasized the unique
circumstances surrounding Bergdahl’s recovery.

332. Anne Gearan & Ernesto Londoño, Taliban Prisoner Swap Possible: Goal Is to Free
U.S. Soldier, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2014, at A1; Schmitt & Savage, supra note 14.
333. This is a result of two factors: the relatively low number of American captives
during the War on Terror and the absence of traditional governments with which to negotiate
for their release. See Schmitt & Savage, supra note 14.
334. See id.
335. See id.
336. The Takeaway with John Hockenberry, What Does the Bergdahl Swap Mean to
Afghans?,
WNYC
RADIO
&
PUB.
RADIO
INT’L
(June
6,
2014),
http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/what-does-bergdahl-swap-mean-afghans/.
337. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 3. Some congressional leaders dispute the date,
stating that they were informed telephonically between May 31 and June 1, and in writing on
June 2. See id. at 3–4. Senator Harry Reid, the Senate Majority Leader at the time, said the
administration informed him of the exchange “immediately before it happened.” Alexander
Bolton, WH Apologizes to Senate Intel Chief for Prisoner Swap Secret, HILL (June 3, 2014),
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/208070-white-house-apologizes-to-senate-intelligence.
Either way, notification occurred well after the thirty-day advance period. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 16, at 3–4.
338. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Eric Schmitt, Bergdahl’s Disciplinary Fate Is Placed in
Hands of Army General, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2014, at A18.
339. See Schmitt & Savage, supra note 14.
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1. Congress Objects to Not Being Properly Notified
and the GAO Declares the Exchange Illegal
Representative Mike Rogers, chair of the House Intelligence Committee,
raised concerns that “this decision will threaten the lives of American
soldiers for years to come,” presumably because the exchange of five
Taliban for one American seemed to reward the enemy for capturing U.S.
personnel.340 Representative Howard McKeon, chair of the House Armed
Services Committee, and Senator James M. Inhofe, the senior minority
member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, echoed this concern
before also objecting to the exchange on constitutional grounds: “Our joy
at Sergeant Bergdahl’s release is tempered by the fact that President Obama
chose to ignore the law, not to mention sound policy, to achieve it.”341
Two weeks after the announcement of the exchange, Senate leaders
requested that the GAO provide its opinion on whether DOD had violated
the notification requirement and spending restrictions contained in the 2014
CAA.342 Sidestepping the constitutional issues, the GAO concluded that
DOD had, in fact, violated section 8111 by not notifying the appropriate
congressional committees at least thirty days prior to the exchange.343 The
use of appropriated funds for a non-appropriated purpose, the GAO found,
also violated the Antideficiency Act because DOD “incurr[ed] obligations
exceeding an amount available in an appropriation.”344 The House
immediately voted to condemn the Obama Administration for failing to
comply with its statutory notification requirements.345
2. The Obama Administration Argues That the Exchange
Was a Valid Exercise of the President’s Power As Commander in Chief
Administration officials countered that delaying the exchange to comply
with the notification requirements “would have left Bergdahl unacceptably

340. Id.
341. Press Release, Rep. Howard P. McKeon & Sen. James Inhofe, Statement on Release
of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in Exchange for Release of Five Guantanamo Detainees (May
31, 2014), available at http://www.inhofe.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/mckeoninhofe-statement-on-release-of-sergeant-bowe-bergdahl-in-exchange-for-release-of-fiveguantanamo-detainees.
342. GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.
343. It also pointed to President Obama’s signing statement in connection with the
spending bills, when he first raised concerns about legislative encroachment on executive
prerogatives. See id.; see also Jack Goldsmith, The Administration’s New (and
Unconvincing) Reading of the Notice Requirement for GTMO Transfers, LAWFARE (June 3,
2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/06/the-administrations-new-andunconvincing-reading-of-the-notice-requirement-for-gtmo-transfers/; Transcript, Legal View
with
Ashleigh
Banfield,
CNN
(June
2,
2014),
available
at
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1406/02/lvab.01.html (containing Jeffrey Toobin’s
analysis of the issue and conclusion that “it’s pretty clear” that the Obama Administration
violated the law).
344. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1, 6.
345. See H.R. Res. 644, 113th Cong. (Sept. 9, 2014).
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This fear stemmed primarily from concerns over
vulnerable.”346
Bergdahl’s health, although it was not clear how his condition had changed
since the last round of negotiations fell through.347 In testimony to the
House Armed Services Committee shortly after announcing the exchange,
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel referred to the need for the executive
branch to act quickly to ensure Bergdahl’s safety.348 Confusion also exists
over whether the Taliban had threatened to kill Bergdahl if the United
States did not accede to its terms.349 Supporters of the decision also
questioned the logic that the deal would encourage future hostage-taking,
arguing that the deal was odious but necessary and comported with a long
tradition of “negotiat[ing] with terrorists.”350
In addition to the excuse of exigent circumstances, the White House soon
offered two other more refined legal arguments: (1) the transfer was lawful
regardless of notification because the Secretary of Defense complied with
the certification requirement in section 1035(b), and (2) providing notice
would have prevented the President from performing his functions as
Commander in Chief, namely the safeguarding of American
servicemembers.351 Once the GAO rejected these approaches, the White
House responded by reiterating its position that it forewent the notification
requirement because it “had a fleeting opportunity to protect the life of a
U.S. servicemember held captive and in danger for almost five years.”352
The White House also apologized to Senator Dianne Feinstein, the chair
of the Senate Intelligence Committee, for committing “an oversight” by not
informing her of the exchange before it happened.353 Despite efforts by the
House to prohibit all transfers or releases from Guantánamo for at least the
next year,354 seventeen detainees have left Guantánamo since the Taliban
Five were transferred to Qatar,355 including four more Taliban who returned
directly to Afghanistan.356 As it stands, neither Congress nor the President
is conceding any authority, and the courts seem unlikely to step in.357
346. Anne Gearan, Sources Outline Conditions in Taliban Leaders’ Release in Exchange
for Bergdahl, WASH. POST, June 5, 2014, at A1.
347. See id.
348. See Calamur, supra note 22.
349. See Gearan, supra note 346.
350. See Alan Gomez, Idea That U.S. Won’t Deal with Terrorists Hardly True, USA
TODAY, June 2, 2014, at A3.
351. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 27, at 1–2.
352. Benjamin Wittes, Administration Response to GAO Report on Bergdahl, LAWFARE
(Aug. 23, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/administration-responseto-gao-report-on-bergdahl/.
353. Bolton, supra note 337.
354. See Josh Gerstein, House: Stop Guantánamo Releases for a Year, POLITICO (June
20, 2014), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/06/house-stop-guantanamoreleases-for-a-year-190808.html.
355. See The Guantánamo Docket:
Timeline:
2014, N.Y. TIMES,
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline/2014 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
356. See Adam Goldman, Four Afghan Detainees Sent Home from Cuba, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2014, at A5.
357. See PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES, supra note 65, at 2 (“Numerically, disagreements
about presidential authority that end without any litigation at all far outnumber those that end
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III. THE PRESIDENT POSSESSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
EXCHANGE TALIBAN DETAINEES FOR A CAPTURED U.S. SOLDIER
DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON GUANTÁNAMO TRANSFERS
Debates over the appropriate balance of legislative and executive powers
have raged since colonial times, and the tension between the political
branches is one of the defining features of American democracy. Within
this broader discussion, evaluation of the competing congressional and
presidential claims over defense policy has been a particularly thorny area.
The controversy over the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange is therefore a mostly
political dispute that also contains deep constitutional implications. The
non-state nature of the enemy in the Global War on Terror also makes this
case unique, with individual actors potentially having an outsized effect on
the “battlefield,” minimal accountability for detainees after they have been
released, and no definitive resolution to the war in sight. Under these
circumstances, Congress arguably should have a greater role in setting
military objectives due to the inherent blurring of tactics and policy.
Regardless, congressional attempts to retroactively dictate prisoner
recovery policy through the use of spending restrictions is a radical
departure from centuries of historical and judicial precedent. The exchange
of detainees and transfer of funds fell solely within President Obama’s
authority as Commander in Chief, and congressional attempts to limit those
powers by financially handcuffing the President’s ability to repatriate an
American servicemember were unconstitutional. Part III.A demonstrates
how this conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
scope of executive authority. Part III.B places the Bergdahl-Taliban
exchange within the longstanding tradition of presidential control over
prisoner recovery policy and concludes that the use of appropriations riders
and notification requirements regarding Guantánamo transfers were cases of
legislative overreach.
A. The Exchange Complied with Judicial Precedent
Although not “every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance,”358 courts traditionally have been reluctant
to consider cases involving an area they regard as primarily the domain of
the political branches.359 The same principle applies to cases that involve
“the Constitution’s government-structuring provisions.”360 With that said, a
constitutional analysis remains relevant because “the Constitution [still] can
influence policy even when it is not enforced by the courts.”361 This part
up in court . . . .”); Fisher, supra note 31, at 484–92; Lobel, supra note 28, at 409; Transcript,
supra note 343 (Toobin concludes that “[t]here’s not going to be any lawsuit about this.
Congress can’t sue the [P]resident for violating this aspect of the law.”).
358. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
359. See Fisher, supra note 31, at 468; Lobel, supra note 28, at 409.
360. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2593 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
361. GRIFFIN, supra note 29, at 4; see Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2593 (“[P]olicing the
enduring structure of constitutional government when the political branches fail to do so is
one of the most vital functions of this Court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); MARIAH
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will illustrate how key Supreme Court decisions enhance the credibility of
the White House’s arguments in favor of the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange.
1. Operating Within Youngstown’s Zone of Twilight
At first glance, the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange seems to fall into the third
Youngstown category because President Obama directly contravened the
appropriations rider’s notification and funding requirements.362 This
admittedly would be the case if the President’s only objective in
transferring the Taliban Five were to hasten the closure of the Guantánamo
detention facility, a process Congress had explicitly sought to stop. Yet this
analysis falls short because it depends on a view of the exchange as the
mere transfer or release of Guantánamo detainees, rather than what it
actually was: an international agreement brokered to secure the safe
homecoming of a U.S. soldier. The Bergdahl-Taliban controversy
implicates the two competing priorities of presidential control over U.S.
prisoner policy and congressional control over defense spending. Any
analysis, including the GAO’s, that approaches the issue from only one of
these perspectives is incomplete. These dueling claims instead shift the
conflict into the middle Youngstown category because both branches have
legitimate claims to authority but are unable to share it.363
As the Court acknowledged, analysis within this category is highly
contextual.364 In Youngstown, for example, the Court struck down
President Truman’s seizure of steel mills because the seizure constituted a
taking of private property by the federal government, an action that
Congress had thoroughly considered and rejected.365 Here, however,
Congress did not consider the possible impact its Guantánamo restrictions
could have on negotiations to repatriate U.S. captives, let alone evaluate and
implement an overarching strategy for their recovery.366
Instead, Congress inadvertently undermined the President’s ability to
negotiate for the release of an American POW, a power that falls solely
under the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.367 The “gloss” on
executive power provided by a history of congressional acquiescence in
matters of repatriation overcame the unrelated statutory restriction on
Guantánamo transfers and permitted the President to recover Bergdahl,
even if he had to exchange Taliban detainees to do so.368 As the sun
continues to set on the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, the zone of
ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY 222 (2013) (“From
impeachment, to the debt crisis, to appointments, to governance overseas, a vast universe of
constitutional problems is handled not through judicial supervision or adherence to
determinate text but rather as a result of legislative-executive interactions.”).
362. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 6–7 & n.7.
363. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Part I.B.2.
365. See supra Part I.B.2.
366. See supra Part II.A.
367. See supra Part I.C.3.
368. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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twilight afforded the President will naturally shadow more areas.369 His
authority always has included the ability to recover a captured U.S.
servicemember.370
2. Dames & Moore’s Deference to Intent
The Court affirmed this approach in Dames & Moore, when it recognized
the need for clear congressional intent to override an executive agreement
negotiated and entered into as the resolution to a major foreign policy
conflict.371 In that case, the Court conducted its analysis in light of the
presence of enabling legislation and the absence of any prohibitive
statutes.372 In the current controversy, Congress granted President Obama
control over prisoner recovery efforts first by acquiescing to presidential
control of that domain and second by not passing any legislation asserting
congressional claims over that power.373
The Court also rejected Dames & Moore’s allegation that the executive
order was a presidential circumscription of the courts’ powers, referring to
clear contextual evidence that the intent of the executive order was to
terminate an international dispute and not to seize control of the domestic
judiciary.374 Congress has raised similar concerns that President Obama
usurped the spending power by ignoring the NDAA rider regarding
notification and funds appropriation.375 Once again, however, a court
would look to the legislative history of the NDAA rider.376 The purpose of
the rider was to prevent the closure of Guantánamo while keeping detainees
out of domestic detention facilities, not to prolong the captivity of a
captured U.S. servicemember.377 The NDAA rider, by setting conditions
on the transfer of detainees from Guantánamo, did not somehow divest the
President of his authority to negotiate for the release of U.S. prisoners of
war.
3. Executive Discretion Under Curtiss-Wright
Finally, under Curtiss-Wright, the President retains a fair amount of
discretion as the sole organ of American diplomacy.378 As the Court noted,
this is “especially . . . true in time of war.”379 The closure of Guantánamo
has both foreign and domestic implications, but the repatriation of an
American POW and the negotiations with the other state and non-state

369. See supra Part I.B.2.
370. See supra Part I.C.3.
371. See supra Part I.B.3.
372. See supra Part I.B.3.
373. See supra Parts I.C.3, II.A.
374. See supra Part I.B.3.
375. See supra Part II.C.
376. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
377. See supra Part II.A.
378. It is important to note, however, that President Roosevelt acted in concert with
congressional authorization, not in contravention of it. See supra Part I.B.1.
379. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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actors involved in that process are purely foreign.380 Furthermore, while it
can be seen as a precursor to the conclusion of Operation Enduring
Freedom, the exchange was not part of a broader pact with the Taliban or
the government of Afghanistan.381 Rather, it more closely resembled an
executive agreement between President Obama and the Qatari emir, who
sealed the deal by personally shaking hands with each other.382 The
Supreme Court has never declared an executive agreement unconstitutional
on the grounds that it usurps Congress’s authority to make treaties, a trend
that, in turn, encourages the President to use executive agreements to
achieve policy goals of narrow scope or limited duration.383 For these
reasons, the Bergdahl-Taliban exchange should be subject to much less
congressional oversight than a domestic issue, such as the transfer of
Guantánamo detainees to the United States, or a foreign issue relating to a
treaty.
B. The Exchange Complied with Historical Precedent
The Bergdahl-Taliban exchange seems unremarkable when it is placed in
the historical context of wartime U.S. prisoner recovery policy. Once
again, referring to the Bergdahl-Taliban controversy as a “release” or
“transfer” of Guantánamo detainees mischaracterizes both its means and its
end. The U.S. government exchanged enemy combatants, regardless of
their status under the Geneva Conventions, for a captured U.S.
servicemember. This section demonstrates that while the exchange is
merely the latest instance of executive control over the recovery of a
captured U.S. servicemember, the 2014 NDAA’s restrictions on
Guantánamo transfers are aberrational attempts at curtailing presidential
discretion.
1. U.S. Prisoner Recovery Policy Always Has Permitted
Exchanging Captured Combatants with the Enemy
The President, acting as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, has
customarily exercised control over efforts to repatriate captured U.S.
servicemembers because that decision often depends on an alignment of
strategic and tactical considerations that cannot occur via legislative
oversight.384 Throughout American history, the President, in consultation
with his staff, has set an overarching recovery policy and then delegated its
execution to his military commanders in the field.385 This approach is
based on an understanding that circumstances change rapidly during war
and that bureaucratic micromanagement or overreach will often hinder
recovery efforts.386
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

See supra Part II.A–B.
See supra Part II.B.
See Gearan, supra note 346.
See HENKIN, supra note 134, at 222.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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George Washington, acting as Commander in Chief of the Continental
Army, established local prisoner exchanges during the Revolutionary
War.387 President Lincoln did the same during the Civil War, with the
added wrinkle that the troops being exchanged for Union soldiers were
technically non-state actors.388 At the height of World War II, the United
States transferred hundreds of thousands of enemy captives to domestic
bases.389 Reciprocal releases during the Vietnam War led to large numbers
of Northern Vietnamese and Viet Cong captives leaving U.S. control
without any guarantee that U.S. troops would be freed.390
Policy aspects aside, these practices demonstrate an unbroken chain of
transfers of enemy captives to either enemy or third-party control in direct
or indirect exchange for the recovery of U.S. prisoners.391 In each case, the
President saw prisoner exchanges as a tool, giving him leverage to more
effectively wage war.392 The exchange of the Taliban Five, a group of nonstate actors transferred to a country not formally allied with either side of
the conflict, for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, a U.S. soldier in Taliban captivity
for five years, neatly complies with each of these precedents. Conversely,
the notification requirements and spending restrictions included in the
2010–2014 NDAAs constituted an unprecedented effort by Congress to
dictate enemy detainee policy.393
Some critics have referred to the prisoner exchange as an unprecedented
instance of the U.S. government negotiating with terrorists and to the one
million dollars paid to the Qataris as a ransom.394 As demonstrated above,
the United States, from the President down to low-level military
commanders, has repeatedly engaged in discussions with opposing forces
over the recovery of its personnel during both conventional and
unconventional conflicts.395 Prisoner exchanges conducted during the
Revolutionary and Civil Wars were far more widespread and far less
controversial than the one-time deal conducted in Afghanistan.396 In
Vietnam, the U.S. military oversaw a system of releases of non-state
actors—the Viet Cong—under far murkier conditions than those
surrounding the exchange with the stateless Taliban.397 Furthermore,
unlike the ransoms paid to the Barbary States in the nineteenth century, the
United States paid Qatar, not the Taliban, to accept the detainees.398 Of
note, the Taliban gained no financial or propaganda benefit from the

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

See supra Part I.C.3.a.
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transfer of one million dollars to the Qataris.399 The exchange, while
imperfect, might have been President Obama’s “least worst” option.400
2. Notification Requirements and Spending Restrictions Had Never Before
Impeded the Recovery of a Captured U.S. Servicemember
The 2014 NDAA’s notification requirements, although rooted in the
tradition of the War Powers Resolution and the Intelligence Oversight Act,
are much more onerous than either of those pieces of legislation and
overstep the bounds of appropriate congressional oversight.
The
notification requirements in the War Powers Resolution are purely
retroactive, applying only after the introduction of U.S. forces to
hostilities.401 Likewise, under the Intelligence Oversight Act, the President
need only inform Congress “in a timely fashion” after the execution of an
especially sensitive covert action.402 The 2014 CAA itself contains looser
reporting restrictions for the assignment of billions of dollars in aid to
Pakistan, providing no deadline for congressional notification if, after
determining that it is in the nation’s interests to do so, the Departments of
Defense and State waive congressionally enumerated restrictions.403
Ex post congressional notification is the norm in cases as sensitive as the
return of the last U.S. POW in the War on Terror, and the stringency of the
preemptive notification requirements is unique to Guantánamo transfers.404
Members of Congress knew about the exchange immediately before or
immediately after it happened, and, either way, the exchange did not come
as a surprise.405 As several of the deal’s most outspoken critics admit,
relevant congressional leaders knew about the proposal as early as 2011.406
Of note, none of the spending bills during this period implied that Congress
could reject a proposed detainee transfer to a foreign country, nor did any of
them provide a means for redress if the President did not comply.407
Notification did not invite consultation, let alone provide an opportunity for
denial. The President should have tried to comply with the statutory
requirements to the maximum extent practicable, but, ultimately, Congress
could not have disapproved of the exchange and intervened to stop it.408
This reality is reflected in the other bedrocks of congressional oversight but
curiously absent from the Guantánamo riders.409
399. See supra Part II.B.
400. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
401. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
402. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(3) (2014); see also supra Part I.C.2.b.
403. See supra Part II.
404. See supra notes 305–08 and accompanying text (discussing sensitive military
operations).
405. See supra Part II.B–C.
406. See supra note 326 and accompanying text. Although this notification did not
comply with the standards laid out in the NDAA because talks with the Taliban were
preliminary at the time, it satisfied a longstanding tradition of “informal” notification and
gave Congress effective notice that a deal was in the works. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 67.
407. See supra Part II.A.
408. See KOH, supra note 58, at 62.
409. Compare supra Part I.C.1–2, with supra Part II.A.
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Shifting the analytical framework from a detainee release to a prisoner
exchange also alleviates the alleged violation of the Antideficiency Act
because prisoner exchanges traditionally fall within the scope of the
discretion granted to military commanders.410 As evidenced in the 2014
CAA’s funding for the Commander’s Emergency Response Program and
the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations, Congress
acknowledged that oversight of wartime funding is necessarily looser than
it would be under different circumstances.411 Congress drew the line at $5
million in these provisions, concluding that anything below that amount
was not worthy of its consideration and recognizing the need to trust the
discretion of local commanders in combat environments.412 The one
million dollars given to the Qataris fell well below the fiscal threshold of
that discretion set by Congress in the 2014 NDAA and CAA.413 Congress
allotted the military more than enough money to secure Bergdahl’s
repatriation. Tying the Army’s OCO funding for combat operations to the
release of Guantánamo detainees, though, depended on a false conception
of the Taliban as something other than a wartime enemy.414
3. Appropriations Riders Are a Means of Shaping Policy,
Not Dictating Tactical Decisions
The NDAA riders prohibiting the transfer or release of Guantánamo
detainees are fundamentally different from earlier congressional attempts to
influence defense policy via its power of the purse because they directly
interfered with the President’s ability to carry out a solely executive
function.415 Unlike the prohibition on military aid to the Contras, the
Bergdahl-Taliban exchange did not constitute a major policy decision
subject to congressional deliberation.416 It was a tactical decision properly
made by the Commander in Chief.
Additionally, the Boland Amendments represented a compromise
between the branches in an area of “shared congressional-executive
The
authority,” specifically military aid and covert operations.417
legislation was relatively narrow in scope, and President Reagan never
voiced any opposition to it.418 Consensus seemed to exist at the time that
the United States should not become involved in Nicaragua.419 On the
contrary, short of vetoing the legislation, President Obama has opposed the
Guantánamo transfer riders at every step of the legislative process, and
Congress has never sought to tie the transfer restrictions to the recovery of
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captured U.S. military personnel.420 There have been no substantive policy
agreements regarding the transfer of detainees from Guantánamo, and the
NDAA rider stymied a major facet of President Obama’s platform while
also restricting his ability to conduct a war.421 This trend does not represent
a consensus on the way forward in Afghanistan, nor on the future of
prisoner recovery policy.
CONCLUSION
President Obama’s recent exchange of five Taliban detainees for a
captured U.S. soldier stirred debate among policy and legal scholars alike.
Congress immediately raised concerns over the constitutionality of the
exchange, arguing that the White House failed to comply with statutory
notification requirements contained in the most recent defense-spending
bill. Congress also objected to the Pentagon’s use of appropriated funds to
effect the deal. Recognizing these concerns, the President and Secretary of
Defense apologized for the lack of notice but defended their actions as
permissible under the executive’s authority as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces. At Congress’s request, the GAO conducted an investigation
and concluded that the President had, in fact, violated the appropriations
riders contained in the 2014 NDAA. The GAO, however, did not address
the underlying conflict between congressional control of defense funding
and presidential control of prisoner recovery policy.
Legal analysis of this conflict begins with the tripartite framework for
evaluation of executive action expressed in Youngstown, which is in turn
highly contextual. Despite congressional oversight of broader strategic
objectives via its power of the purse, decisions over how to repatriate
captured U.S. servicemembers always have been the President’s
prerogative. Furthermore, Congress attached the riders to the 2014 NDAA
as a means of obstructing the closure of the Guantánamo detention facility,
not in an effort to suddenly start overseeing prisoner recovery policy.
Finally, the notification requirements and spending restrictions relating to
the transfer of Guantánamo detainees were much more cumbersome than
historical and contemporary precedents for operations of similar scale to the
recovery of Sergeant Bergdahl. As such, the riders unconstitutionally
impeded the President’s ability to recover a captured servicemember, an
area over which he has exercised sole control throughout U.S. history.
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